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Judicial Independence and the Rationing of Constitutional Remedies
Aziz Z. Huq*
Abstract
This Article analyzes the doctrinal instruments federal courts use
to allocate scarce adjudicative resources over competing demands
for constitutional remedies. It advances two claims. The first is that
a central, hitherto underappreciated, doctrinal instrument for
rationing judicial resources is a demand that most constitutional
claimants demonstrate that an official violated an exceptionally
clear, unambiguous constitutional rule—that is, not only that the
Constitution was violated, but that the violation evinced a
demanding species of fault. This fault rule first emerged in
constitutional tort jurisprudence. It has diffused to the suppression
and postconviction review contexts. The Article’s second claim is
that fault-based rationing of constitutional remedies flows, to an
underappreciated degree, from a commitment to judicial
independence. Federal courts have developed branch-level
autonomy, along with distinctly institutional interests, over the
twentieth century. These interests are inconsistent with the
vindication of many individualized constitutional claims. While
ideological preferences and changing socioeconomic conditions
have had well-recognized influences on the path of constitutional
remedies, I argue that the judiciary’s institutional preferences
have also played a large role. This causal link between judicial
independence and remedial rationing raises questions about
federal courts’ function in the Separation of Powers.
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Introduction
Article III adjudication is a scarce good.1 This is not just a function of rising caseloads,
statutory as well as constitutional, outstripping federal courts’ capacity.2 It also flows inexorably
from the fact that settled constitutional rules are daily broken. Between the 1950s and the 1970s,
the Supreme Court fashioned a thick network of constitutional rules to bind police officers,
prisons officials, prosecutors, state trial court judges, and front-line bureaucrats.3 These rules are
often observed now only in the breach. Even in the well-structured, closely supervised context of
state criminal courts, there is ample evidence constitutional rights are systemically flouted.4
Some municipal justice systems may stay solvent by illegally depriving citizens of basic
liberties. 5 On our nation’s streets, constitutional violations are routinized in some urban
neighborhoods.6 And we have simply no reliable way to know how often zoning officials,
welfare bureaucrats, or prison guards act on unconstitutional grounds or discard mandatory
procedures.
So mundane and so frequent are violations of settled constitutional rules that federal
courts plainly lack capacity to offer relief in all cases given their current levels of staffing and
resources. True, federal courts need write no new law to resolve these cases. But even if the law
is clear, there are, as Blackstone observed “above a hundred of our lawsuits [that] arise from
disputed facts, for one in which the law is doubted of.”7 Even if constitutional rules were
wrought with crystalline transparency, the demands of factual adjudication mean that not even a
1

Judicial recognition of this point is frequent. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080 (2011) (“Courts
should think carefully before expending scarce judicial resources to resolve difficult and novel questions of
constitutional or statutory interpretation that will have no effect on the outcome of the case.”) (internal quotes
omitted); see also Marin K. Levy, Judicial Attention As A Scarce Resource: A Preliminary Defense of How Judges
Allocate Time Across Cases in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 401, 401 & n.2 (2013)
(collecting statements by judges and numerical evidence of increasing caseload pressures).
2
Between 1990 and 2012, federal district courts’ combined civil and criminal caseload rose by 31 percent, whereas
the number of judges rose by 17.7 percent. United States Courts, Judicial Facts and Figures 2012 Table 6.1: Total
Civil and Criminal Cases Filed, Terminated, and Pending (Including Transfers), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialFactsAndFigures/judicial-facts-figures-2012.aspx.
3
For a celebratory account, see MORTON J. HOROWITZ, THE WARREN COURT AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE (1998).
4
See, e.g., Am. Bar Ass'n Standing Comm. on Legal Aid & Indigent Defendants, Gideon's Broken Promise:
America's Continuing Quest for Equal Justice: A Report on the American Bar Association's Hearings on the Right
to Counsel in Criminal Proceedings (2004), available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_aid_indigent_
defendants/initiatives/indigent_defense_systems_improvement/gideons_broken_ promise.html;
see also Eve Brensike Primus, A Structural Vision of Habeas Corpus, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 16–23 (2010) (cataloging
many more entrenched practices in state criminal courts that violate defendants’ constitutional rights).
5
See, e.g., Monica Davey, Ferguson One of 2 Missouri Suburbs Sued Over Gauntlet of Traffic Fines and Jail, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 8, 2015, at A8 (describing law suit challenging municipal policies resulting in routine jailing of the
poor). Alice Goffman’s recent ethnography of inner-city Philadelphia is also replete with examples of how basic
liberty rights are routinely violated by urban criminal justice systems. ALICE GOFFMAN, ON THE RUN: FUGITIVE LIFE
IN AN AMERICAN CITY (2104).
6
A 2002 Bureau of Justice national survey thus estimated that police used force against individuals on 664,500
instances annually, and that approximately 500,000 of those usages were perceived to be excessive. Matthew R.
Durose et al., Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Contacts between Police and the Public: Findings
from the 2002 National Survey, at v (2005).
7
3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 330 (Oxford, Oxford Univ. Press 1765-69)
(spelling adjusted).
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fraction of constitutional violations can be resolved in federal court. For this reason alone, the
supposedly “settled and invariable principle” of public law, famously articulated by Chief Justice
John Marshall, “that every right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and every injury its proper
redress”8 is increasingly elusive.
But if some rationing of constitutional remedies is inevitable, how is it to be done—and,
just as importantly, by whom? This Article analyzes the how and who questions prompted by
remedial scarcity in constitutional law. It advances two claims. First, the Court has developed a
gatekeeping rule of fault for individualized constitutional remedies ranging from constitutional
tort to habeas to the exclusionary rule. In a previous article, I identified in passing this
transubstantive migration, but did not analyze comprehensively its causes or effects.9 Building
on that work here, I develop a more extensive account here of the fault’s role in constitutional
remediation. Second, I contend that standard accounts of the narrowing of constitutional
remedies since the 1980s have omitted one important factor: judicial independence has enabled
and motivates the fault-based gatekeeping system used for constitutional remedies. Because the
fault rule emerges directly from the federal courts’ ability and willingness to pursue distinctive
institutional interests and preferences, these lines of cases suggest that rather than enabling the
vindication of constitutional rights, the independence of Article III tribunals can impede their
realization. In positing a causal connection between judicial independence and the fault barrier to
constitutional remediation, I do not aim to deny that other factors, including judicial ideology,
the politics of crime, or beliefs about the moral worth of relevant rights holding populations,
have played a role. Nevertheless, the distinctive contribution of this Article is an excavation and
analysis of one causal strand of judicial behavior that to date has been largely ignored.
The term “fault” is a legal term of art requiring definition.10 Following the Supreme
Court, I use the term “fault” in a specific, narrow sense. In this constitutional remedies context,
the term “fault” is used to pick out cases in which it was not possible for the offender to
“reasonably believe” they were acting consistent with the Constitution.11 That is, a fault-based
gatekeeping rule requires that a constitutional litigant identify not merely a constitutional
violation, but an especially clear and unambiguously applicable constitutional rule that was selfevidently violated.12 The magnitude of the legal error, that is, must be substantial. The Court, that
is, could plausibly (and with some gain in accuracy) have used a term such as “unreasonable
fault,” but it did not do so, and it would be confusing to innovate in terminology here. And while
the Court employs the language of blameworthiness, the term fault in this concern does not pick
out any facts about the state of the defendant’s state of mind.
8

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137, 147 (1803). In this passage, Chief Justice Marshall was discussing
the common law writ system, in which such a one-to-one correspondence between rights and remedies existed. The
quotation
9
Aziz Z. Huq, Habeas and the Roberts Court, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 582 (2014) [hereinafter “Huq, Habeas”]
(discussing the role of fault). A student note published later the same year also noted commonality of approaches
across remedial domains, largely to criticize rather than to explain. See Thomas K.S. Fu, Against Doctrinal
Convergence in Constitutional Remedies, 10 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 293, 297 (2014).
10
Cf. Kyron Huigens, Solving the Apprendi Puzzle, 90 GEO. L.J. 387, 419-20 (2002) (exploring the overlapping
meanings of fault and culpability)
11
John C. Jeffries, Jr., Compensation for Constitutional Torts: Reflections on the Significance of Fault, 88 MICH. L.
REV. 82, 98 (1989).
12
One might reasonably protest that the Court should employ a term such as “unreasonable fault,” but it has not
done so. I shall confuse matters by diverting from its terminology.
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The Article’s first contribution is to show how a gatekeeping fault rule emerged and
assumed a supervisory role in titrating most individualized constitutional remedies.13 Fault is a
familiar element of constitutional tort doctrine in the form of the qualified immunity defense, and
also a (less noticed) dimension of municipal liability doctrine.14 Fault has also spilled over into
the substantive law of certain constitutional provisions that commonly form the basis of
constitutional tort actions, such as the Due Process Clause. Less noticed still is fault’s contagion
into new remedial contexts and even some substantive law domains.15 Since the late 1980s, it has
come to dominate the law of postconviction relief for prisoners under 28 U.S.C. §2254. Further,
it is increasingly the modal gatekeeping rule for criminal defendants seeking a suppression
remedy after a Fourth or Fifth Amendment violation. One consequence of fault’s ascendency
within the doctrinal framework of constitutional remedies is that modal question in constitutional
litigation today is therefore no longer whether the Constitution has been violated. It is rather
whether the violation was sufficiently clear and self-evident to warrant the expenditure of scarce
judicial resources. Another consequence is that the benefit of the doubt in almost all close cases
goes to the state, not the putative rights holder.
Why has this version of fault, which hinges on the clarity of the violation at the time it
occurred and favors the state, become the organizing principle of remedial rationing? The
Article’s second contribution is a causal hypothesis: One of the important, yet wholly
overlooked, causes of the fault-based rationing system for constitutional remedies is from the
institutional independence of the judiciary.16 My hypothesis, to be clear at the threshold, is not
that remedial rationing is solely or uniquely a downstream effect of judicial independence.
Contemporary accounts of the Burger Court noted the role of ideological interests and historical
circumstances in shaping the path of constitutional remedies.17 I do not revisit or cast doubt on
13

See infra Part I (extending and substantiating this account).
Professor John Jeffries has written a series of important articles identifying and defending the regulative role of
fault in constitutional tort. See Jeffries, Compensation, supra note 11, at 96-101; see also John C. Jeffries, The
Liability Rule for Constitutional Torts, 99 VA. L. REV. 207, 209 (2013) (presenting “a unified theory of
constitutional torts”); John C. Jeffries, Jr., Disaggregating Constitutional Torts, 110 YALE L.J. 259 (2000)
[hereinafter “Jeffries, Disaggregating”]; John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109
YALE L. J. 87, 98–100 (1999); John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84 VA.
L. REV. 47, 49 (1998). Jeffries, however, has not extended the analysis beyond the constitutional tort context as this
Article seeks to do.
15
In charting the spillover of fault to the definition of substantive rights, I confess to stepping beyond my remedial
remit in order to illuminate the doctrine better.
16
By referring to judicial independence, I do not refer to the sense of “decisional independence of individual judges”
but in the sense of “the institutional independence of the judiciary as a whole.” Vicki C. Jackson, Packages of
Judicial Independence: The Selection and Tenure of Article III Judges, 95 GEO. L.J. 965, 967 (2007).
17
See, e.g., Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Burger Courts'
Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185, 247 (1983) (arguing that the Burger Court favored “judicial deregulation of
state and federal criminal justice officials,” and showed “hostility to fair process norms that impair the state's
capacity to detect and punish the factually guilty); Alan M. Dershowitz & John Hart Ely, Harris v. New York: Some
Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198, 1227 (1971)
(noting the “[i]deological ebb and flow” in the Court’s criminal procedure jurisprudence); Louis Michael Seidman,
Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of Continuity and Change in Criminal Procedure, 80 COLUM.
L. REV. 436, 437 (1980) (arguing that “Burger Court is undoubtedly more interested than its predecessor in using the
criminal process to effect broadscale crime prevention and control” but also noting that these aspects of the Court
had been overstated).
14
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those claims. Nevertheless, while the literature has canvassed extensively the role of ideological
change on the Court, it has not yet grappled with the important role that the interests and
preferences of the judiciary as an institution have played in shaping the doctrine of constitutional
remedies. In the absence of strong judicial independence, I hypothesize, remedial rationing
would not have taken the form, or perhaps gone to the lengths, observed today. It is infeasible
now to disentangle the precise causal contributions of partisan ideology and the judiciary’s
institutional interests. I do not try to do so, but rather aim to show how an account of recent
constitutional doctrine without accounting for institutional interest is incomplete.
Supplementing extant accounts of doctrinal change with institutional concerns is of no
mere antiquarian interest. It has contemporary ramifications. An account of remedial rationing
leaning wholly on ideological change would imply that changing the composition of the Court
now will conduce to a change in the availability of remedies. By contrast, my account predicts
that this will not be so. Rather, even a high court with a higher proportion of members appointed
by Democrats would not behave all that differently. For whatever partisan flag they try to
occlude, Justices of left and right alike have historically evinced a powerful allegiance to the
institutional concerns of the Article III courts—or so I will try to show.
No smoking gun underwrites this hypothesis about institutional interests. Rather, the
evidence I will present for a causal link between judicial independence and remedial rationing is
circumstantial in character. As a threshold matter, I demonstrate that the two standard reasons for
explaining remedial rationing are incomplete. First, the current doctrinal regime for redressing
violations of individual constitutional rights cannot be explained by reference to legislative
action alone. In many statutory domains, including civil rights, Congress has played a large role
in creating and modifying remedies.18 Not so when it comes to strictly constitutional remedies.
Although Congress has influenced some remedial regimes, its most important interventions have
come too late to have causal force, and too often merely embodied previously articulated judicial
preferences. 19 Second, ideological preferences over constitutional rights and rights-holding
populations do not explain all doctrinal change. To a greater extent than appreciated,
constitutional remedies have been narrowed by ideologically mixed coalitions of the Court. And
standard ideological reasons, such as a concern that certain remedies will overdeter state
officials, beg more questions than they resolve. The poverty of both standard accounts points to
the need for alternative explanations, and opens the way for an new accounting.
I propose to supplement standard accounts by highlighting the role played by the
judiciary’s institutional interests.20 The positive case for attributing remedial rational to judicial
independence, in addition to ideology, starts from the context in which the doctrine changed. The
gatekeeping role of fault crystallized largely in the early 1980s. In this era, new pressures
impinged on the Article III judiciary. These pressures arose, in particular, from the rise of mass
incarceration, which began in the early 1980, and which created metastasizing demands for
18

See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1077 (1991).
See Huq, Habeas, supra note 9, at 531 n.44; see also infra text accompanying notes 198 to 200.
20
For an empirical account of the judiciary’s institutional development emphasizing the vast gains it has made in
legitimacy and authority, see Kevin McGuire, The Institutionalization of the U.S. Supreme Court, 12 POL. ANALYSIS
128 (2004). For a historical account also illustrating the steep gradient in institutional growth, see JUSTIN CROWE,
BUILDING THE JUDICIARY: LAW, COURTS, AND THE POLITICS OF INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT (2012).
19

4

criminal adjudication and postconviction review.21 Further, recent empirical work demonstrates
that the Justicess’ behavior is often shaped by “institutional”22 considerations that to date have
been largely ignored. Indeed, Justices have explicitly, if occasionally, identified institutional
interests as a motive in narrowing constitutional remedies. Finally, an analysis of the remedial
contexts in which the Court has not extended the fault rule supports the inference that
institutional incentives are at work in shaping the doctrine.
This causal vector—from the judiciary’s institutional interests to remedial constriction—
is not only missing from previous accounts, but is roughly the inverse of one standard account in
the literature, offered by the late William Stuntz. According to Stuntz, it was the generosity of
federal constitutional remediation that induced legislatures to tilt toward more punitive policies.23
While recognizing this account as theoretically sophisticated and parsimonious, I supplement
previous empirical criticisms24 by suggesting that constitutional doctrine responded to—and did
not cause—the massive changes in the volume and punitiveness of American criminal justice
systems starting the 1970s, with the judiciary’s institutional interests playing an important
mediating role.
The principal aims of this Article are descriptive: the identification and diagnosis of an
immanent rationing principle governing much constitutional remedies doctrine, and the
development of a hypothesis, supported by circumstantial evidence, of one important causal
force. This analysis, important on its own terms, also clears ground for normative analysis of
what role federal courts can play, or ought to play, in the enforcement of settled constitutional
rules. Determining the optimal degree of judicial enforcement of constitutional rules is a large
task, one that in part turns on considerations of what role is best assigned to the political
branches and to state actors. I do not claim to solve that recalcitrant problem here. Still, my
analysis of remedial scarcity has immediate and important normative and theoretical
implications. Perhaps most importantly, it should unsettle some persistently unexamined truisms
of constitutional law.
Conventional Separation of Powers jurisprudence takes it for granted that the
independence of Article III judges exists “‘not to benefit the judges,’ but ‘as a limitation imposed
in the public interest’ … by helping to secure an independence of mind and spirit necessary if
judges are “to maintain that nice adjustment between individual rights and governmental powers
which constitutes political liberty.’”25 As recently as March 2015, members of the Court have
pronounced without contradiction that “the ‘separation of powers’ [is] essential to the protection
21

See generally TODD R. CLEAR & NATASHA A. FROST, THE PUNISHMENT IMPERATIVE: THE RISE AND FALL OF
MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA (2014).
22
Thomas M. Keck, Party, Policy, or Duty: Why Does the Supreme Court Invalidate Federal Statutes?, 101 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 321, 323 (2007).
23
See William J. William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice,
107 YALE L.J. 1, 64 (1997) [hereinafter “Stuntz, Uneasy Relationship”]; see also William J. Stuntz, The
Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505 (2001).
24
For a devastating analysis of the empirics of Stuntz’s claims, see Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Justice, Local
Democracy, and Constitutional Rights, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1045 (2013).
25
United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557, 568 (2001) (citations omitted); accord Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245, 249
(1920) (“The Constitution was framed on the fundamental theory that a larger measure of liberty and justice would
be assured by vesting the three great powers, the legislative, the executive, and the judicial, in separate
departments.”).

5

of individual liberty.”26 This truism assumes an alignment between judicial incentives and the
vindication of “individual rights” and “political liberty.” But Separation of Powers theory is
peculiarly silent on how that alignment might come about, or why institutional incentives would
necessarily conduce to the vindication of rights.27 This Article’s account of remedial rationing in
the shadow of judicial independence demonstrates that judicial incentives and the interests of
constitutional rights holders need not run together. Instead, they not only can, but do, diverge
sharply as a result of the judiciary’s institutional interests. These can stand starkly at odds with
the rights-holding public’s concerns. This gap should provoke hesitation before mechanically
endorsing canonical Separation of Powers assumptions. It also may yield cause to question
efficiency-based and distributive justice-based justifications for assigning a central role in
constitutional rights enforcement to the federal courts.
The analysis offered in this article is limited along three important dimensions. First, I
focus here solely on constitutional claims, not statutory claims, and limit my analysis to doctrines
regulating the capacity of courts to respond to allegations of a constitutional wrong (e.g., by
suppressing evidence by vacating a conviction, or by awarding damages). For this reason, I label
this limited domain one concerning constitutional remedies, i.e., individualized requests for
judicial responses to constitutional wrong. These cases comprise a significant slice of the federal
docket—with prisoner cases taking up about a fifth of the number of civil suits filed in district
courts in recent years.28 Hence, while judicial workload is also a function of statutory causes of
cases, the domain addressed here is nontrivial in scope, and hence worthy of independent
study.29 Moreover, there is some reason to believe that the Court acts as if it has a heightened
measure of policy-making discretion when it comes to constitutional remedies, as opposed to
statutory forms with respect to which it purports to hew to congressional will. Hence, although
remedial rationing might plausibly be studied in respect to other statutory domains (say,
immigration law or social security claims) or other procedural devices (say, the dwindling of the
class action), the area of constitutional remedies with which I am concerned represents a
particularly fertile perspective on judicial preferences and behavior.30
26

Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1215 (2015) (Thomas, J. concurring) (quoting Stern v.
Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2608–09 (2011)).
27
The failure of traditional Separation of Powers theory to specify a persuasive causal channel for claimed effects of
institutional design is has been noted in other contexts. For an application in the context of legislative/executive
relations, see, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV.
2311, 2324–25 (2006) (“[T]he political interests of elected officials generally correlate more strongly with party
than with branch . . . . [P]arty is likely to be the single best predictor of political agreement and disagreement.”); see
also Aziz Z. Huq, Libertarian Separation of Powers, 8 NYU J.L. & LIBERTY 1006, 1012 (2014) (expressing
skepticism about the necessary connection between the functional separation of different elements of governmental
power and the promotion of liberty).
28
Administrative
Office
of
the
U.S.
Courts,
District
Courts,
tbl.
3,
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2013/us-district-courts.aspx.
29
Parallel accounts might be told in regard to other domains of public law. See, e.g., J. Maria Glover, The
Disappearing Shadow of Public Law, – YALE L. J. – (forthcoming 2015).
30
My focus on remedies means that I also do not attend to other devices for limiting the flow of claims or reducing
the costs of adjudication in this domain. One might also look at attorney’s fees. For example, in Buckcannon Board
& Care Home v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Services, the Court interpreted the Civil Rights
Attorney’s Fees Award Act of 1976, to permit fees awards only when a judgment, court-approved settlement, or
some other order formally changed the legal relationship between the parties. 532 U.S. 598, 609 (2001). In an
equitable suit challenging an institutional practice after Buckcannon, defendants can litigate equitable claims to the
point of judgment, and then avoid fees by consenting to the relief requested.

6

Second, my argument concerns federal courts as axiomatic loci for the vindication of
federal constitutional rights.31 I do not assume (implausibly) that federal courts are the sole
venue for vindicating those rights. On the contrary, federal courts must often stay their hand to
allow state courts a first effort at resolving a constitutional issue,32 while state courts can also
play a role in vindicating constitutional entitlements even when their perpetrator is a fellow
member of the state bar.33 Nevertheless, even if state courts are “presumed competent to resolve
federal issues,34 it is hard to see how they could play a comprehensive role. State courts cannot
issue mandatory writs against federal officials, 35 or free a federal prisoner from unlawful
confinement.36 More diffusely but as importantly, federal courts today by “consensus” occupy a
dominant position among courts when it comes to the vindication of constitutional rights.37 In
addition to state courts, there are also sites of constitutional enforcement within the federal
government. The executive branch, for example, wields large authority over determinations of
how laws are enforced and defended from constitutional attack, supplying a nonjudicial forum
for rights vindication.38 A 1994 statute also vests the Department of Justice with authority to
force institutional reform in police departments.39 But §14141’s deployment is neither uniform
nor comprehensive.40 Even with executive aid, the federal judiciary still provides a unique
fulcrum from which rights can be leverage

31

Hence, this Article does not address the different ways in which structural constitutional values might be enforced.
Cf. Aziz Z. Huq, Standing for the Structural Constitution, 99 VA. L. REV. 1435 (2013) (analyzing the choice
between public and private enforcement of structural constitutional values).
32
See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (limiting the availability of pretrial federal injunctive relief
against state criminal process). The role of state courts was especially important in the early Republic. See Alfred
Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1109, 1142 (1969) (“Despite their remedial deficiencies, it was
the state courts that were looked to [before 1875] for the vindication of constitutional rights, subject to review by the
Supreme Court.”). For an example of path-marking state court action on constitutional rights, see Goodridge v. Dep't
of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (recognizing a right to same-sex marriage under state constitutional
law).
33
Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 117 (1985) (expressing “confidence that state judges, no less than their federal
counterparts, will properly discharge their duty to protect the constitutional rights of criminal defendants”); see also
Giovanna Shay, The New State Postconviction, 46 AKRON L. REV. 473, 475 (2013) (noting that state postconviction
proceedings “are being forced to assume a new role in the development of federal constitutional criminal
procedure”).
34
Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 150 (1988).
35
McClung v. Silliman, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 598, 605 (1821) (holding that a federal official’s “conduct could only be
controlled by the power that created him”).
36
Tarble’s Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1871); Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859).
37
Ann Woolhandler, The Common Law Origins of Constitutionally Compelled Remedies, 107 YALE L.J. 77, 111-25
(1997) [hereinafter “Woolhandler, Common Law Origins”] (arguing that there is a “consensus that the federal courts
should administer a federalized set of rights and remedies for federal constitutional rights”).
38
Cf. Aziz Z. Huq, Enforcing (but not Defending) ‘Unconstitutional’ Laws, 98 VA. L. REV. 1001, 1001-02 (2012)
(discussing modalities of executive enforcement of the Constitution).
39
42 U.S.C. § 14141 (authorizing the Justice Department to seek injunctive relief against departments with a pattern
of unconstitutional conduct).
40
See Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive Policing Reform, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1, 57-61
(2009) (noting “the Justice Department's failure to achieve widespread results” using § 14141, but questioning
feasibility of supplementing it).
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Finally, this Article analyzes the remedial function of the federal courts, not its distinct
role in defining rights.41 This focus on constitutional remedies builds upon an emerging body of
scholarship recognizing that questions of “what to do about a completed or threatened violation
of law” are “distinct from the question of whether there has been or is about to be a violation.” 42
That literature, though, has to date not focused on the scarcity problem. It has instead examined
the interaction between remedial design and the substance of constitutional rights, not the
solution for remedial scarcity.43 While this work contains important insights, it assumes that
remedial design is a function of how courts view substantive rights. In contrast, this Article takes
remedial design on its own terms, considers how and why it developed, and identifies normative
implications—particularly for the Separation of Powers.
The argument proceeds in three stages. Part I establishes the centrality of fault in the
rationing of three individualized constitutional remedies—money damages actions,
postconviction relief from unconstitutionally imposed criminal sentences, and the suppression of
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth or Fifth Amendment. Part II turns to the etiology of
fault’s regulative role. I argue that the rise of fault cannot be ascribed solely to Congress or the
shifting ideological preferences of the Justices—perhaps the two most obvious alternatives. I
then offer positive evidence to support the hypothesis that one of its underappreciated causes is
judicial independence. Part III then examines some normative consequences of this between
judicial independent and the regulative role of fault, In particular, I suggest that the account of
remedial rationing offered here casts doubt on some central assumptions in Separation of Powers
jurisprudence.
I.

Fault and the Rationing of Constitutional Remedies

This Part advances the descriptive claim that the Supreme Court has installed a
requirement of fault as a threshold gatekeeping rule for constitutional remedies. This fault rule
arose in the late 1970s and early 1980s. It diffused from constitutional tort law to postconviction
habeas law and the rules governing the exclusionary rule as a remedy for Fourth and Fifth
Amendment violations. It has also seeped into the substantive law in some domains. In its modal
form, the fault-based gatekeeping rule observed across these domains requires that an individual
litigant must demonstrate that the relevant constitutional violation was clear and unambiguous at
the moment of the alleged violation in order to access either trial or a remedial order.

41

For examples of scholarship that explores how courts define rights in optimal or suboptimal ways, compare
Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV.
1212, 1215 (1978) (describing and criticizing underenforcement of equal protection norms), with Emily Sherwin,
Judges as Rulemakers, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 919 (2006) (defending the common-law method of generating
constitutional rules).
42
Douglas Laycock, How Remedies Became A Field: A History, 27 REV. LITIG. 161, 164-65 (2008).
43
See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Fourth Amendment Remedies and Development of the Law: A Comment on Camreta v.
Greene and Davis v. United States, 2011 CATO SUP.CT. REV. 237, 244-45 (2011) (considering interactions between
changes in exclusionary rule doctrine and qualified immunity doctrine for the development of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence); Jennifer E. Laurin, Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing and Convergence, 111
COLUM. L. REV. 670, 706 (2011) [hereinafter “Laurin, Trawling”] (suggesting the Court’s impetus for “conceiving
of the exclusionary rule as a remedy premised upon fault and desert” derives from constitutional tort doctrine).
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A fault rule of this kind emerged first constitutional tort law under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
so-called Bivens suits; 44 spread to the exclusionary rule in Fourth and (increasingly) Fifth
Amendment contexts; and also to postconviction review of state and federal convictions.45 I
should be explicit here that this list does not cover the waterfront of constitutional remedies.
Indeed, I shall argue in Part II that the Court has conspicuously failed to extend the fault rule to
other sorts of constitutional challenges.46 So my claim here is not that the Court has evinced
blanket skepticism or hostility to constitutional remediation. Rather, I aim here to chart the
domain in which the Court has erected barriers to some forms of relief—domains in which the
demand for remediation is especially steep—while bracketing consideration of why that rule has
not been extended further until Part II.
To analyze the regulative function of fault in constitutional remedies, I begin by briefly
summarizing how the remedial mechanisms at issue evolved from, and superseded, a common
law framework of constitutional enforcement mechanisms. Unlike previous accounts, I
underscore the migration of rationing rules from the familiar context of qualified immunity into
not just some domains of constitutional law, but also parallel remedial mechanisms such as the
exclusionary rule and postconviction habeas.47 Moreover, unlike previous accounts, my account
deliberately underscores the fact that fault has become central not because of legislative choice,
but rather as a consequence of unbounded judicial policy discretion. The fact that judges, rather
than policy-makers in the political branches, have been at the forefront in responding to the
problem of remedial scarcity in constitutional law is central to the causal link between judicial
independence and remedial rationing that I develop at length in Part II.
A.

The Remedial Dispensation for Individualized Constitutional Wrongs

The current dispensation for constitutional remediation is of relatively recent vintage.
From the Republic’s founding until the early twentieth century, courts enforced constitutional
rules largely via state-law tort and contract actions for damages into which federal-law elements
could be injected.48 Even the federal government could be brought into constitutional compliance
using a common-law action such as ejectment.49 Constitutional adjudication would typically
arise in common law contexts when a state defendant endeavored to deflect liability in pointing
44

Under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396-97 (1971), the
Court created a private cause of action for money damages against federal officials in their personal capacity who
violate certain constitutional rules. Bivens involved a Fourth Amendment violation; the Court has subsequently been
“circumspect” about extending the Bivens cause of action to other contexts. James E. Pfander & David Baltmanis,
Rethinking Bivens: Legitimacy and Constitutional Adjudication, 98 GEO. L.J. 117, 118 (2009).
45
See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (authorizing federal courts to grant habeas relief to prisoners); §§ 2254 & 2255 (setting
forth, respectively, rules for state prisoners and federal prisoners).
46
See infra Part II.B.
47
This is called “borrowing” by Nelson Tebbe and Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, 108 MICH. L. REV.
459, 463 (2010) (defining constitutional borrowing as “an interpretive practice characterized by a deliberate effort to
bridge disparate constitutional fields for persuasive ends”).
48
Sina Kian, The Path of the Constitution: The Original System of Remedies, How it Changed, and How the Court
Responded, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 132, 134 (2012) (noting that the Constitution was originally “to be implemented
through remedies available for violations of common law rights”); accord Woolhandler, Common Law Origins,
supra note 37, at 79-81.
49
Antonin Scalia, Sovereign Immunity and Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative Action: Some
Conclusions from the Public-Lands Cases, 68 MICH. L. REV. 867, 882-86 (1970) (describing this practice).
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to a source of official authority and the plaintiff in response involved the Constitution to pierce
that defense.50 In these early cases, courts’ role was limited to determining whether the conduct
in litigation was lawful and then deciding whether “to award damages.”51 It was then up to the
legislature to determine whether to indemnify the defendant official.52
This common-law system of enforcement “dwindled”53 over time for several interlocking
reasons. First, state-law tort actions raising constitutional issues “by ‘imperceptible steps’ came
to be seen as federal causes of action” by the end of the nineteenth century.54 Second, federal
judges in the mid-1800s began to invoke with increasing frequency inchoate conceptions of
immunity to deflect private suits against state actors, with the result that common-law damages
actions for constitutional violations “atroph[ied].”55 For example, ejectment actions against the
federal government, once common, came to seem eccentric, even impermissible.56 Third, the
post-Civil War economic boom led to a wave of regulation that in turn fed demand for property
right-like protections from unconstitutional state action that could not be satisfied via the
traditional common law forms.57 Finally, the common-law writ system itself fell into desuetude
as simplified pleading, embodied in the 1934 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, came to
dominate judicial practice.58
To fill the gap left by common law actions, federal courts drew upon statutory causes of
action and innovated to create new remedial pathways. This Part focuses on three remedial
pathways, all of special relevance for vindicating individuals’ constitutional rights against
routine unconstitutional actions by line police officers, prosecutors, and bureaucrats. These three
mechanisms are constitutional tort actions, postconviction habeas actions, and motions for the
exclusion of unconstitutionally secured evidence in the course of a criminal trial. These remedies
have important commonalities. Each targets a discrete official action usually targeting a
particular individual, not a policy or statutory command, and seeks an individualized remedy
50

Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 44, at 134 (noting that “[for much of the nation's history, state common law
provided victims with a right of action that ... could eventually result in the vindication of their constitutional rights”
by treating the constitutional violation as “invalidat[ing] any authority conferred by federal law”
51
James E. Pfander & Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private Bills: Indemnification and Government
Accountability in the Early Republic, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1862, 1868 (2010); see also Bowden v. Morris, 3 F. Cas.
1032, 1032 (C.C.E.D. Va. 1876) (No. 1,715) (“Except in cases where property is taxed, or otherwise taken for public
purposes [government cannot deprive a person of rights without] “suit in a court of justice.”).
52
Pfander & Hunt, supra note 51, at 1867 (noting that “reimbursement of a well-founded claim [was viewed] more
as a matter of right than as a matter of legislative grace”).
53
Kian, supra note 48, at 134.
54
Woolhandler, Common Law Origins, supra note 37, at 101
55
Ann Woolhandler, Patterns of Official Immunity and Accountability, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 396, 422-29, 45051 (1987) [hereinafter “Woolhandler, Patterns”].
56
See, e.g., Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643, 648 (1962) (disallowing ejectment action against federal officer to
recover real property in the absence of a claim that the officer's conduct violated the Constitution); Larson v.
Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 687-88 (1949) (barring claim against federal officer to enjoin
breach of contract).
57
Woolhandler, Patterns, supra note 55, at 452 (“[T]he change in the types of property that increasingly became the
subject of government regulation may have been partly responsible for the modern dichotomy between damages and
injunctive relief.”).
58
Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982)); Stephen N.
Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135
U. PA. L. REV. 909, 913(1987) (exploring “the revolutionary character of the decision inherent in the Federal Rules
to make equity procedure available for all cases”).
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(e.g., money, evidentiary suppression, or release). Each also has roots in the late nineteenthcentury or early twentieth century, quickly fell into desuetude, and then did not see vigorous
usage until the 1960s.59 Together, they comprised the remedial side of the Warren Court’s
aggressive campaign to install the Bill of Rights and rein in states’ and localities’ police,
prosecutors, prison officials, and petty bureaucrats.
The Court’s reconstruction of constitutional remedies had three prongs. First, in 1961 the
Court in Monroe v. Pape revived a civil damages remedy enacted as part of the Reconstructionera Ku Klux Klan Act,60 for use against civil action for damages, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against state
actors that violated the Constitution.61 Until this date, §1983 had not been an effectual response
to unconstitutional state action because courts had required that plaintiffs show state law
authorization for an alleged unconstitutional act.62 In the 65 years of the statute’s first enactment,
one study found only nineteen instances in which §1983 had resulted in a reported decision.63
When courts did consider its effect, federal judges typically failed to impose any effectual
remedial consequences.64 After Monroe, the discrete, discretionary, and dispersed actions of state
and municipal front-line officials became plausible subjects of judicial review for constitutional
compliance. Also in the forty years after Monroe, the volume of constitutional damages actions
filed pursuant to § 1983 increased by two orders of magnitude.65 That growth was abetted by the
Court’s 1978 decision to expanded government tort liability by permitting suits against
municipalities where “the action is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes” a law
or policy.66
Supplementing the Court’s novel regulation of state front-line officials was a new
willingness to review the constitutionality of discretionary decisions by federal officials
interacting with citizens. Congress had enacted no civil action for constitutional torts actions
against federal officials parallel to § 1983. Nevertheless, the Court in 1971 inferred a damage
remedy directly from the Constitution in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics.67 Notably Bivens concerned the Fourth Amendment rights of a putative
drug dealer during an FBI raid on his home68—the same kind of routine, hard-to-observe official
exercise of discretion that § 1983 also distinctly addressed. While the Supreme Court evinces
59

Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1533 (1972)
(commenting almost contemporaneously on the expansion in remedial resources in the individual rights context in
this era).
60
Ku Klux Klan Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, §1, 17 Stat. 13 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §1983 (2000)).
61
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961).
62
Id. (rejecting the then-dominant position that 42 U.S.C. §1983 allowed suit only when the alleged constitutional
violation was authorized by state law). Also, constitutional rights were often narrowly defined.
63
Note, Limiting the Section 1983 Action in the Wake of Monroe v. Pape, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1486, 1486 n.4. (1969).
64
See, e.g., Hemsley v. Myers, 45 F. 283, 290 (C.C.D. Kan. 1891) (describing statute as purely “declaratory,”
creating no new rights or modes of proceeding).
65
David C. Rudovsky, Running in Place: The Paradox of Expanding Rights and Restricted Remedies, 2005 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1199, 1208 (noting that the number of nonprisoner civil rights suits increased from 150 in 1961 to 42,354 in
1998).
66
Monell v. N.Y. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978) (ruling on a policy that compelled pregnant
employees to take unpaid leaves of absence).
67
403 U.S. 388, 396-97 (1971) (recognizing cause of action for damages under Fourth Amendment).
68
For details about Webster Bivens and the search challenged in that case, see James E. Pfander, The Story of
Bivens v. Six Unknown-Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, in FEDERAL COURTS STORIES 275, 27577 (Judith Resnik & Vicki C. Jackson eds., 2009).
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persistent leeriness of expanding the availability of damages actions against federal officials in
new contexts, 69 the Bivens remedy remains a hardy perennial in the lower courts. Recent
empirical work suggests that Bivens actions succeed between 17% and 34% of the time.70
The second expansion of constitutional remedies also occurred in 1961, when the Court
in Mapp v. Ohio expanded the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule remedy that had, until then,
only availed defendants in federal courts trials71 to also cover prosecutions in state courts.72
Then, as now, it was state officials, not federal officials, who were tasked with the lion’s share of
policing. Incorporation of the exclusionary rule suddenly meant that that Court’s 1949
incorporation of Fourth Amendment rights in Wolf v. Colorado suddenly had practical effect
where previously it has been, in effect, a dead letter.73 Five years after imposing the exclusionary
rule against the states in the Fourth Amendment context, the Court extended the exclusionary
rule to the Fifth Amendment’s rule against coerced testimony. In Miranda v. Arizona, the Court
installed a prophylactic regime of oral warnings in the police interrogation context with
enforcement again flowing through an exclusionary rule over a patchwork of state practices that
sometimes included warnings, and sometimes did not.74
Exclusionary rules in these contexts do not, strictly speaking, remedy the privacy,
dignity, and security harms that the relevant constitutional provisions seek to prevent, but rather
have been explained as vehicles for deterrence.75 To that extent, my terminology of remedies is
imprecise. Nevertheless, not all remedies place litigants precisely in the position they would have
been in absent a wrong occurring.76 Exclusion is fairly classed as a remedy to the extent it is
sought by a putatively injured party, and purports to eliminate an advantage that the state as
counterparty possesses as a consequence of the constitutional wrong.
Finally—and roughly contemporaneously with these developments in constitutional tort
law and the exclusionary rule—the mid-century Court also breathed new life into the writ of
habeas corpus as a postconviction remedy for constitutional criminal procedure violations.77 For
almost the first century of the Republic, the habeas writ was not available as a postconviction
69

See Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 44, at 118 (noting that the Court “has grown a good deal more circumspect”
in extending Bivens to new doctrinal contexts).
70
Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and Its Consequences for the Individual
Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. REV. 809, 842-46 (2010).
71
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 389 (1914) (unanimously applying the exclusionary rule in federal
prosecutions).
72
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651 (1961) (describing the exclusionary rule as “part and parcel” of the Fourth
Amendment). The Court has subsequently repudiated this account of the exclusionary rule. United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
73
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949) (incorporating the Fourth Amendment against the states). Even when
the U.S. Supreme Court itself explicitly recommended a federal prosecution for criminal trespass against local
officials who had violated the incorporated Fourth Amendment, no remedy was to be had. There was no
investigation. The Department failed even to open a file on the matter. Morgan Cloud, Rights Without Remedies:
The Court That Cried "Wolf", 77 MISS. L.J. 467, 492-97 (2007) (discussing Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128
(1954), in which that happened).
74
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 447-48 (1966).
75
See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 796 (1994).
76
Consider the persistent refusal of courts to give consequential damages for contract violations.
77
Not until 1867 did Congress expand the writ to encompass review of state convictions. See Hadley v. Baxendale,
9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
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remedy.78 It was employed indeed on rare occasions as a preemptive shield against criminal
prosecution. 79 Only in 1867 did Congress expand the writ to encompass review of state
convictions.80 The 1867 statute, though, was not followed by a expansion in habeas challenges. It
was not until a series of four decisions starting in 1953 with Brown v. Allen81 that procedural
constraints on habeas review withered.82 In the following four decades, the volume of habeas
litigation lodged by state prisoners engorged even more dramatically than § 1983 filings.83
It is important to reiterate here that the three remedies identified here do not cover the
waterfront of potential judicial mechanisms for enforcing the Constitution. Indeed, an important
element of Part II’s argument will focus on how exceptions to the fault rule create incentives
over the kind of constitutional suits litigants file. To anticipate that discussion, it is worth noting
here the two most important alternatives to damages, exclusion, and habeas relief as vehicles for
individuals to secure some judicial response for a constitutional wrong.
First, at least since the 1907 decision in Ex Parte Young, federal courts have issued
injunctions against state officials barring them from civil or criminal enforcement of a state law
when the action on the ground that enforcement will violate the constitutional rights of the
plaintiff.84 Today, plaintiffs invoking Young can allege an ongoing violation of federal law and
obtain prospective relief without regard to state sovereign immunity. 85 Second, in 1934,
Congress enacted a federal Declaratory Judgment Act86 pursuant to which plaintiffs could secure
relief against state actors even when an injunction could not be obtained. 87 Injunctive or
declaratory relief is of limited utility in many instances. When a constitutional violation is
inflicted without prior notice, and where the damage immediately realized—as is often the case
when police, prosecutors, and bureaucrats are concerned—then neither an injunction nor a
declaratory judgment will be of great use. In such cases, the vindication of individual
78

Cf. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82 (not extending habeas to post-conviction review).
See, e.g., Ex Parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 95 (1807).
80
Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, 385-86.
81
44 U.S. 443 (1953).
82
NANCY J. KING & JOSEPH L. HOFFMANN, HABEAS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: USES, ABUSES, AND THE
FUTURE OF THE GREAT WRIT 56-57 (2011) (describing causes and size of shift in postconviction habeas filings).
83
Id. at 60. The rise in habeas filings is likely a consequence of the dramatic expansion in incarceration that
characterizes federal and state criminal justice policy since the beginning of the 1970s. See generally
BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 12-15 (2006). The rise of mass incarceration also led
to a sharp rise in the volume of prisoner litigation. Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555,
1578-87 (2003) (documenting evidence).
84
The pivotal case is Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (authorizing injunction against unconstitutional state
action absent specific statutory authorization for that remedy), but federal courts issued injunctions against
unconstitutional state action long before Young, see Edwin M. Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE
L.J.1, 19 n.70 (1924) (collecting cases dating from 1838).
85
Virginia Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 131 S. Ct. 1632, 1639 (2011); accord Verizon Md. Inc. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 1645 (2002). Congress, however, can foreclose a Young injunctive remedy by
enacting a sufficiently specific statutory scheme. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 73-76 (1996).
Further, Young cannot be used to obtain funds from a state’s treasury, see Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 666
(1974), or order specific performance of a State's contract, In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887).
86
Act of June 14, 1934, c. 512, 48 Stat. 955.
87
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 (1974) (holding that declaratory relief was available even though the
threatened state criminal prosecution could not be enjoined). For an argument that the gap between injunctive and
declaratory relief is elusive, see Samuel L. Bray, The Myth of the Mild Declaratory Judgment, 63 DUKE L.J. 1091,
1095 (2014).
79
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constitutional rights will generally hinge on whether an individual litigant can avail themselves
of a constitutional tort action, a suppression motion, or a postconviction remedy. Absent these
tools, a constitutional violation will have no legal or practical consequence.
B.

Fault in Constitutional Tort Law

But when do plaintiffs have access to remedies such as damages, suppression, or habeas
relief? Since the mid-1970s, the Court has rationed the availability of each of these three
remedies by installing a threshold requirement that individual rights claimants must typically
demonstrate that an offending state official not only violated the Constitution, but did so in an
especially flagrant and obvious way. That is, it is often no longer sufficient to allege a violation
of the Constitution. It is also necessary to allege that the violation of the Constitution was
especially clear and unambiguous so as to warrant the expense of trial and the imposition of
liability. The Court has framed this threshold requirement as one of “fault” or “culpability.”88
Because the latter term can be used to mark out the distinctive aspect of conduct warranting
criminal, but not civil penalties,89 I borrow only the Court’s usage of “fault.” To emphasize, I use
that term solely to identify conduct in which the constitutional violation is unambiguously clear
ex ante, and not to gesture toward an inchoate notion of moral blameworthiness.
The move toward fault is clearest in the constitutional tort context, and it is there I start.
Within this doctrinal domain, fault is a familiar element qualified immunity doctrine, but also
plays a central regulative role in municipal liability doctrine, and even in the substantive law
defining some of the constitutional torts most commonly enforced through § 1983 and Bivens
actions. But conventional accounts of this doctrine miss two points that I stress in the following
account of qualified immunity and cognate fault rules in constitutional tort law. First, the fault
role stands on no legislative foundation, but is rather a function of relatively freewheeling
judicial policy-making discretion. Second, although notionally explained as a way of making
officials’ tasks easier, the fault rule in constitutional tort serves also to mitigate pressure upon
judicial effort and resources.
1.

Fault as the Operative Principle of Qualified Immunity

No federal statute creates immunity from tort liability in officer suits pursuant to § 1983
or Bivens. Rather, official immunity is the Justices’ creation. This is most clearly evident in the
incremental fashion it has emerged, a pathway that bears the clear fingerprints of conscious
judicial policy-making, rather than any fidelity to legislative intent. 90 Initially, qualified
immunity was modest in theory and effect. The Court in the 1967 case of Pierson v. Ray first
granted immunity to officers acting pursuant to a state statute later held unconstitutional on the
ground that such immunity was a “settled principle of law” Congress had not meant to abolish

88

Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404-05 (1997) (using the terms “fault” and
“culpability” almost interchangeably); see also City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 391 (1989).
89
Issachar Rosen-Zvi & Talia Fisher, Overcoming Procedural Boundaries, 94 VA. L. REV. 79, 94 (2008) (noting
that “moral culpability” characterizes criminal conduct, but not conduct to which civil penalties attach).
90
See Alan K. Chen, The Facts About Qualified Immunity, 55 EMORY L.J. 229, 233-61 (2006) (providing a
chronological account of the development of immunity doctrines) (.
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when enacting the Ku Klux Klan Act. 91 Both Pierson’s holding and its reasoning were
circumscribed. First, only official actions taken “in good faith,” and, with respect to police, on
the basis of “probable cause” secured an exception from liability.92 That is, the ex ante existence
of some positive legal authority for an official act seemed key to immunity. Second, the Court
recognized only such immunity as existed at common law, and then only because it presumed
that Congress did not lightly unsettle “solidly established” common law principles.93 Legislative
intent, therefore, was the touchstone of Pierson’s analysis.
Subsequent immunity opinions acknowledged Pierson’s foundation in background tort
rules defeasible only by clear congressional statement.94 But the Court’s later expansions of
qualified immunity rapidly came unmoored from Pierson’s historical anchorage, and instead
gained momentum from the express invocation of policy considerations. The result was a switch
in immunity’s breadth: Where Pierson intimated that immunity availed if the official could point
to the existence of a positive source of plausible authority for a challenged act, later cases took as
a touchstone the absence of a prohibitory source of law as a touchstone. This pivot dramatically
engorged immunity’s reach, albeit without any clear normative justification from the Court.
In 1975, the Court in Wood v. Strickland began to modify the theoretical foundations, if
not the scope, of immunity. Such immunity, explained the Wood Court, applied so long as
officers acted good faith without malicious intent, and neither reasonably know, nor reasonably
should have known, of its illegality.95 Wood did not move far from Pierson’s focus on the
existence of positive legal authority. Yet rather than locating its immunity rule in the common
law, the Court looked directly to “strong public-policy” considerations for its justification.96 In
particular, the Wood Court conjured the concern that “even the most conscientious …
decisionmaker [would be deterred] from exercising his judgment independently, forcefully, and
in a manner best serving the long-term interest of the [state] school and the students.”97
Seven years later, the Court invoked the same deterrence-related policy concern, but in so
doing expanded the substantive reach of qualified immunity. In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the Court
invoked again deterrence-related public policy considerations, but abandoned Wood’s subjective
good-faith requirement.98 The Harlow Court instead shielded officials from liability unless their
conduct “violate[d] clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.” 99 That is, immunity would attach in the absence of a clear
91
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prohibition—rather than (as in Pierson) in the presence of a clear authorization. In a subsequent
case, the Court further refined the Harlow test by insisting that it would be applied to allegations
in the most “particularized” sense possible, such the illegality of an alleged violation must be
starkly “apparent.”100 Today, the Court characterizes qualified immunity as protecting “all but
the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law,” and not merely those who (as
in Pierson) reasonably rely on the constitutionality of a prior statutory enactment.101 As far as
money damages are concerned, the Constitution is a hazard only for the blunderer and the
fool.102
In comparison to its antecedent in Pierson, the current iteration of qualified immunity has
two important qualities. First, since Wood, the Court has made no pretense of mining the
common law or legislative intent for direction, but has engaged in naked policy-making. The
demand for particularity, for example, is grounded solely on first-order consequentialist analysis
of tort’s feedback effect on official action.103 Second, notwithstanding the pragmatic foundation
of the doctrine, the proffered justifications for qualified immunity do not explain its actual scope.
The Court has repeatedly expressed alarm about tort’s potential chilling effect on official
action.104 But the Court has never explained how that overdeterrence rationale motivates the
move from Pierson’s demand for positive law to Harlow’s search for a clear prohibition. Worse,
the Court has never offered any empirical evidence that overdeterrence is in fact a problem.
Recent empirical work on indemnification of tort actions in the policing context demonstrates
that, at least in that context, indemnification is “virtually always” available,105 even when the
officer in question has violated both the Constitution and relevant criminal law.106 Indeed, many
jurisdictions do not even have a mechanism to transmit information gained through lawsuits to
police departments that employ serial rights offenders.107 Although this data has only become
available recently, earlier studies reached substantially parallel results.108 This data suggests that
it has never been the case that individual officials are likely to pay from their own pockets. This
100
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means not only that the Court’s overdeterrence argument based on the direct effect of money
damages is not persuasive as a matter of fact.109 It also means that the central element of the
qualified immunity edifice was one asserted without foundation by the government, and accepted
on the basis of mere governmental ipse dixit by the Court. The Court has built a comprehensive,
transubstantive doctrinal framework for limiting constitutional remedies without ever asking
whether its basic empirical predicate held true. This is, to say the least, a noteworthy omission
that raises the question whether something other than (imaginary) overdeterrence concerns are at
play.
Even if the reason the Court gives for its currently robust iteration of qualified immunity
fails, there is an obvious alternative. Qualified immunity is “‘an immunity from suit rather than a
mere defense to liability.’”110 It is designed to “permit the defeat of insubstantial claims without
resort to trial.”111 So powerful is this preference for pretrial resolution of constitutional tort
claims that the Court has crafted an atextual exception to the general prohibition on interlocutory
appeals when qualified immunity is denied.112 Qualified immunity therefore does not merely
economize on the litigation expenses of public officials, it also rations out judicial resources with
increasing care.113 And whereas the overdeterrence-related justification for qualified immunity
rests on elusive, and perhaps false, empirical supposition, the judicial economy justification for
qualified immunity is both immediately clear and obviously true.
2.

Fault’s Spillovers from Constitutional Tort Doctrine

The fault rule embedded in today’s qualified immunity law has leaked from its original
locus in constitutional tort doctrine into three contexts where the Court’s overdeterrence concern
plainly does not apply. This spillovers further undermine the conclusion that deterrence concerns
explain the domain of tort-related fault.
First, at least formally the protections of qualified immunity does not apply to tort actions
against municipalities.114 Nevertheless, current doctrine is calibrated so as to require a showing
that a municipal defendant not only violated a constitutional rule, but affirmatively chose to
ignore a clear constitutional prohibition. In Board of County Commissioners v. Brown, the Court
stated, without explanation or elaboration, that “rigorous standards of culpability and causation
must be applied to municipal liability cases.”115 This demand has had the greatest practical force
in cases alleging municipal liability based on improper training or supervision. Such liability can
be established only by showing a constitutional deficiency was “so obvious, and the inadequacy
so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights” that policymakers could be said to be
109

Qualified immunity might be defended based on officials’ risk aversion based on the prospect of averse career
consequences, selection effects, and the distribution of political costs. Jeffries, Disaggregating, supra note 14, at
267-68. But even advocates of these arguments concede that they rest on “fundamentally speculative” empirical
grounds. Id. at 268.
110
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).
111
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 (1982); accord Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 305-06 (1996).
112
See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985) (extending government officers a right to interlocutory appellate
review of decisions that reject a qualified immunity defense).
113
It is worth noting that the Court has not required state courts to follow Mitchell’s exception from the rule against
interlocutory appeals. See Johnson v. Frankell, 520 U.S. 911, 913 (1997).
114
Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 624-25 (1980).
115
520 U.S. 397, 390 (1989) (emphasis added).

17

“deliberately indifferent.”116 That is, it extended the fault role (understood once more not as a
demand for blameworthiness but rather a gross form of constitutional error) to facilitate
threshold dismissal.
For example, rejecting a recent suit challenging repeated prosecutorial misconduct in
New Orleans, the Court set aside a jury finding of liability because the plaintiff had failed to
show “[p]olicymakers’ ‘continued adherence to an approach that they know or should know has
failed to prevent tortious conduct,” notwithstanding a string of cases in which state courts had
reversed convictions based on the state’s misconduct.117 As the dissent noted, the trial record in
that case evinced “the conceded, long-concealed prosecutorial transgressions were neither
isolated nor atypical.”118 In practice, this ruling means that moving a municipal liability claim
from the pretrial stage to plenary courtroom proceeding requires strong threshold evidence of a
persistent pattern of unconstitutional conduct amounting to intentional violation of the
Constitution—evidence that, in the majority of cases--that will in practice be unavailable to most
plaintiffs without discovery.
Notwithstanding its rigorous enforcement of the fault rule in the municipal liability
context, the Court has not explained why there is a need to avoid overdeterrence in such cases.
Unlike individual officials, municipalities are comparatively well placed to internalized both the
costs and benefits of constitutional violations, and thus not err on the side of excessive
precaution.119 The current doctrine’s structure, by contrast, means that municipal entities will
systematically fail to internalize the costs of unconstitutional actions. At the very least, there is
some reason to think that municipal liability should be more expansively available than
individual officer liability if the focal concern is ovedeterrence.120 The Court, in short, has not
even tried to explain—and may not be able to explain—its extension of fault from the individual
to the municipal liability context based on deterrence concerns. That extension, however, may
alternatively fit an account focused on the need to titrate carefully judicial resources in a world
where towns and cities routinely and persistently violate the Constitution.
Second, the Court has extended an analog fault rule from qualified immunity to
challenges to unconstitutional taxes. Ex post remedies for an invalid tax are available only when
“legislators would have good reason to suppose that enactment of the … tax would … violate
their oath to uphold the United States Constitution.”121 In practice, this is one of a series of
impediments that complicate challenges to unconstitutional taxes, rendering may such challenges
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futile.122 It is salient because it extends the same fault-based framework familiar from qualified
immunity to a context in which concerns about overdeterrence are, at minimum, weak.
Legislators responsible for taxation have staff, including lawyers, capable of sophisticated legal
and constitutional analysis. It might be thought that doctrinal rules should incentive a high
degree of care among such legislators, rather than subsidizing carelessness. If the justification for
a fault-based safe harbor is the husbanding of judicial interests, by contrast, this extension of
qualified immunity may seem more sensible.
Third, starting in the early 1980s, the Court has fashioned a set of rules to limit
constitutional tort actions for state deprivations of liberty and property interests in the absence of
intentional or systemic state actions.123 In 1981, the Court imposed an exhaustion rule for tort
suits based on a state official’s discretionary act depriving a person of property—a charge likely
to most common in the policing and incarceration contexts.124 In the 1986 Daniels v. Williams
decision, for example, the Court held that merely negligent acts do not amount to a deprivation
under Due Process Clause. 125 Like qualified immunity doctrine, Daniels and the related
exhaustion rule require an allegation that a defendant official has traduced an especially obvious
and unambiguous constitutional rule to move past a threshold motion to dismiss to get to trial
and potential liability. Mere negligence that extinguishes a life or destroys property yields no
cause for remediation. 126 That rule, though, only apply to “random and unauthorized”
deprivations of liberty or property, which cannot be challenged unless and until state remedies
have been exhausted, and not in challenges to systematic policies that result in constitutional
deprivations.127 That is, they apply precisely when the volume of suits demanding relief is likely
to be greatest.
This is also one of the rare instances in which one need not guess at the Court’s attention
to its own institutional concerns—they are explicit and on the surface of the opinions. The Court
has repeatedly announced that § 1983 should not become “font of tort law to be superimposed
upon whatever systems may already be administered by the States.”128 The concern with federal
caseload management—even at the cost of allowing a tranche of constitutional violations to pass
122
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without any effectual remedy, at least from a federal court—is visible on the surface. Moreover,
it is presented without any effort to explain why the class of plaintiffs thereby deprived of a
remedy are otherwise undeserving.
Fault’s penumbral extensions in the constitutional tort context to municipal liability suits,
challenges to unconstitutional state tax, and random, unauthorized liberty or property
deprivations are not well explained by the motives evinced in Harlow and subsequent qualified
immunity cases. They are, by contrast, well fitted to the goal of rationing valuable judicial
resources. They hence provide some reason to posit the institutional concerns of an independent
judiciary as having causal effect.
C.

Fault and the Exclusionary Rule

Fault has also leaked from the constitutional tort context to the exclusionary rule context
in the Fourth Amendment context and, increasingly, in the Fifth Amendment context. The
trajectory of fault as a threshold constraint on suppression remedy evinces several commonalities
with analog doctrine in the constitutional tort context. First, while initially glossed as a remedy
for overdeterrence, its applications quickly outpaced that justification. Second, it too has leaked
into the substance of the Fourth Amendment. Finally, as in the constitutional tort context, there is
some threshold circumstantial evidence that judicial interests, rather than officials’ interests,
better explain the doctrine’s development.
Unlike the issuance of damages pursuant to § 1983, the exercise of judicial power that
comprises the exclusionary rule lacks a clear statutory foundation. Moreover, since 1974, when
the Court characterized it as a discretionary mode of Fourth Amendment enforcement, its
constitutional basis has been at least contestable.129 For a decade thereafter, the Mapp rule
nevertheless endured roughly unscathed. Its doctrinal retrenchment began not at a litigant’s
behest, but at the Court’s. It was the Court that sua sponte ordered reargument in 1983 in Illinois
v. Gates on the question whether Mapp should be modified “not to require the exclusion of
evidence obtained in the reasonable belief that the search and seizure was consistent with the
Fourth Amendment.”130 Although the Court did not reach this issue in Gates, Justice White’s
concurrence invoked the recently decided Harlow v. Fitzgerald 131 opinion as a guide to
narrowing Mapp.132 Beyond touting the benefits of a fault-based safe harbor for effective law
enforcement, Justice White also drew attention to the rule’s payoff to the judiciary in terms of a
“reduction in the number of cases which will require elongated considerations of the probable
cause question.”133 Concerns of judicial economy, in short, were plainly in view from even
before the fault rule was installed into the structure of exclusionary rule jurisprudence.
A year later, Justice White would write for the Court in United States v. Leon and fashion
a “good-faith” exception for searches in reliance upon warrants not supported by probable
129
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cause.134 The Leon Court once more cited qualified immunity precedent, intimating thereby that
the exclusionary rule would not apply absent intentional or recklessly negligent action. 135
Consistent with these citations, Leon then deployed the concern with excess deterrence familiar
from Harlow, asserting that a magistrate who issued a warrant based on an erroneous probable
cause determination lacked any “stake in the outcome of particular criminal prosecutions” and
consequently would not be affected by subsequent suppression.136 Completing the circle, Justice
Stevens would later observe that the Leon standard would in turn influence the Court’s approach
to the level of specificity at which a qualified immunity analysis would be pitched.137
The Leon exception was at first limited to cases in which the issuing magistrate had erred,
and an officer had reasonably relied on her decision. Subsequent cases extended Leon to cases
where police officers erred by relied on subsequently invalidated criminal statutes138 or lateroverruled Supreme Court precedent,139 and also where a warrants issued as a result of errors by a
court administrator140 or an administrator within the police department itself.141 In recent cases,
the Court has come close to generalizing Leon’s germ into a generally applicable barrier to
suppression on Fourth Amendment ground absent “deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent
conduct” or “recurring or systematic negligence.142 A deterrence-based line reasoning in the
context of policing and criminal trials has led the Court to roughly the same fault threshold
gatekeeping rule as the “policy” considerations invoked in the distinct constitutional tort
context.143 Just as in the tort context,144 moreover, a fault-based gatekeeping rule for suppression
134
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creates a category of cases in which a person has neither an ex ante opportunity to challenge a
government action, nor any ex post remedy for a constitutional violation.145
One other extension of Leon merits elaboration here. The Court’s focus on
overdeterrence suggests that its fault gatekeeping rule should not be extended to intentional
Fourth Amendment violations or the substance of Fourth Amendment law. As in the
constitutional tort context, however, fault has seeped out from the domain in which its notional
deterrence-related justifications apply to domains in which its justification does not obtain. In
Hudson v. Michigan, the Court held that the exclusionary rule inapplicable to violations of the
“knock-and-announce” rule146 for warrant executing on the ground that the interests protected by
the knock-and-announce rule were causally unrelated to the likelihood that evidence would be
discovered.147 In addition to leaning on the (obviously flawed) logic that suppression would fail
to create an incentive for police to comply with a constitutionally compelled rule, the Hudson
Court fell back on the assertion that the “increasing professionalism of police forces” meant
exclusion was no longer necessary.148 While notionally framed in deterrence terms, the force of
this argument is hard to discern: For even if police are professionalized, this does not mean that
they will necessarily follow a constitutional rule that can by law be violated without
consequences. To the contrary, as David Sklansky has noted, when California amended its state
constitution to provide that garbage searches were unconstitutional but that no exclusionary rule
applied, police were “trained to ignore” that constitutional rule, and instead conduct illegal
garbage searches. 149 Professionalism hence simply increased the alacrity with which
unconstitutional practices spread in the absence of likely remediation. To assume, as the Hudson
Court seems to, that professionalism correlates with diminished rates of constitutional violation
is not obviously justified.
In 2015, the Court extended the fault rule from the remedies context to the substantive
law of the Fourth Amendment, tracking the remedies-to-substance spillover observed in
constitutional tort law.150 Again, the deterrence rational for this migration is hard to discern. In
Heien v. North Carolina, the Court (over a lone dissent from Justice Sotomayor) held that a
police state based on an erroneous police belief that a criminal law had been violated did not
violate the Fourth Amendment provided that the officer’s “not … perfect” grasp of the law was
“reasonable.”151 Heien is notable because it extends Leon’s logic to the substance of the Fourth
Amendment. To the extent that logic endeavors to map the limits of deterrence, Heien’s appeal is
“an official’s conduct … governed by the subconstitutional immunity standard … and without a clear guide for
future conduct”).
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again elusive: It is not obvious why police officers charged with executing the law should not
labor under an incentive to become accurately informed about the law, especially when citizens
work under a parallel obligation.152 The extension of fault in the Fourth Amendment suppression
remedy context is thus no longer fully explained by the Court’s own deterrence rationale (if it
was ever so explained). Rather, as with the constitutional tort context, a close study of doctrinal
development suggests that the Court is the principal architect in this fault rule, and that looming
large among its motives is an institutional concern with judicial economy.
Moreover, once nested in Fourth Amendment law, the fault rule has proved contagious
across remedial boundaries within criminal procedure law. Consider the Fifth Amendment
prophylactic regime of Miranda v. Arizona153 Early cases applying Miranda eschewed any
notion of fault.154 A fault rule entered Fifth Amendment jurisprudence in litigation over a police
tactic that involved violating Miranda by failing to give warnings, giving the requisite warnings,
and then rehearsing the same questions to obtain testimony that had previously been aired. In
Oregon v. Elstad, the Court held that a second statement obtained after warnings could be
admitted even if it was arguably the product of a first unwarned statement.155 Confronted by a
deliberate strategy of using unwarned questioning to inform Mirandized interrogation in
Missouri v. Seibert, however, the Court fragmented, with a plurality adopting an approach that
purported to focus solely on the efficacy of any warning eventually delivered. 156 Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence, however, focused on the intentional quality of the Miranda violation,
importing a notion of fault (albeit not the unreasonable fault that characterizes other remedial
domains).157 Subsequently, lower courts have looked to officers’ intentions to analyze Miranda
violations in the two-stage interrogation context. 158 Hence, the operative Fifth Amendment
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remedial rule in Seibert’s wake increasingly tracks the fault-based logic of Leon and its progeny
in sorting for deliberate constitutional violations and disregarding negligent violations. The
seemingly inexorable spread of fault as a threshold trigger for suppression remedies in criminal
trials confirms the ascendency of fault as a regulative principle for individualized constitutional
remedies.
D.

Fault in Postconviction Habeas Jurisprudence

The third remedial domain in which fault has come to play a pivotal rationing function is
postconviction habeas review. Since 1867, the postconviction writ has provided a procedural
vehicle for state and federal prisoners to challenge their confinement on the ground that there
was a constitutional error in their initial criminal adjudication. 159 The present law of
postconviction review is, to say the least, labyrinthine. 160 I focus here on advancing two
relatively limited claims about habeas doctrine. First, a fault rule plays the same gatekeeping
function in the habeas context as it does in the constitutional tort and the exclusionary rule
domains. Second, even though postconviction habeas is necessarily a statutory creation, it has
been the Court that has taken in laboring oar in endowing fault with a regulative function.
Tracking the etiology of the fault rule in the constitutional tort context, the parallel habeas rule
has evolved gradually and incrementally through a process of common-law adjudication. And
third, this regulative function is best explained in terms of judicial economy concerns.161
From its inception, the mid-century reinvigoration of collateral relief from state criminal
convictions attracted fierce criticism for its psychological and practical toll upon state criminal
justice systems.162 It was not, however, until 1989 that the Court in Teague v. Lane began to
carve out a safe harbor for state officials who complied with contemporaneously applicable
constitutional rules—and correspondingly began to deny relief to litigants who failed to identify
an especially glaring constitutional error.163 Formally a rule about retroactivity, Teague in fact
tracked the early versions of fault found in cases such as Pierson164 and Evans.165 By holding
that habeas petitioners could not obtain relief based on violations of constitutional rules
announced after their convictions became final,166 it held state officials responsive for extant
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constitutional law, but not its potential expansions. That Teague was inspired by the logic of
qualified immunity was immediately apparent to sophisticated observers, even if not explicit on
the face of the decision.167 Just how far the Court would take the analogy would take time to
surface.
The first doctrinal move moving the fault rule in habeas into lock-step with its cognate
rules in constitutional tort and evidentiary suppression came a year later, when the Court held
that state-court convictions would be assessed for Teague novelty against a specific and granular
version of the precedent, not the general principle of constitutional law embodied by the case.168
This development paralleled the demand for specificity in constitutional tort law.169 Just as in the
constitutional tort context, the demand that habeas petitioners identify a specific rule extant at the
time their convictions became final meant that “any decision, reasonably distinguishable on its
facts from prior decisions,” could be ranked as an unenforceable new rule, especially since the
mere fact of “actual disagreement among courts” counting as evidence of reasonable
disagreement.170
Here, the evolution of fault in postconviction review diverges from its trajectory in the
constitutional tort and exclusionary rule contexts: Unique to the habeas context is a measure of
congressional involvement in the form of the 1996 Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act (AEDPA). 171 AEDPA imposed a suite of new constraints on postconviction petitions,
including a new statute of limitation, more stringent rules against seriatim petitions, and a more
onerous standard of review172 Nevertheless, at least in terms of its key fault rule, AEDPA was
largely anticipated by judicial developments, and the effect of AEDPA has proved to be largely a
function of judicial glosses—interpretations that have altered dramatically over time absent any
congressional updating. The semblance of congressional control, in short, is largely illusory:
Calibration of the fault rule in habeas jurisprudence has in significant measure fallen within
judicial discretion.
The primacy of judicial policy discretion in fault’s emergence can be perceived by
placing AEPDA in a larger context. Prior to AEDPA, Teague deference to state court
determinations applied solely to pure questions of law, not the mixed questions of law and fact
that dominate in habeas practice.173 Asked to extend Teague deference prior to AEDPA in 1992,
the Court splintered in Wright v West, with Justice Thomas’s opinion pressing toward an
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expansion of Teague securing only two other votes.174 What the Court could not muster a
majority to install by common-law adjudication, however, Congress was able to push through in
the heated aftermath to a major domestic terrorism incident.175 Four years after West, Congress
included in AEDPA stringent standards of review for legal and factual error of state court
convictions.176 Assuming the state court reached the merits, AEDPA directed that its decision
could be adjudged on the merits only if “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”177 It
is worth emphasizing that this is, like qualified immunity, a gatekeeping rule. Habeas petitioners
who surmount that hurdle still have to establish an independent entitlement to constitutional
relief.178
As first enacted, AEDPA’s core gatekeeping rule as codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)
merely accomplished what Justice Thomas exhorted in West. It extinguished most de novo
review in federal habeas consideration of state criminal convictions in favor of a fault-based
standard akin to the demand for evidence of an unambiguously unconstitutional action in
constitutional tort law.179 That fault rule, moreover, applied to not just questions of law but also
mixed questions of law and fact. As a legislative enactment, therefore, AEDPA merely borrowed
from previously expressed judicial preferences.
Nor has the fault rule of § 2254(d)(1) remained fixed since its enactment in 1996. Beside
the absence of formal statutory changes, the Court has incrementally altered its interpretation of
that provision to the point where relief is available only when a state court violation of
constitutional rights is, in effect, grossly negligent or intentional. This process of common law
adjudication has over time aligned the fault rule for habeas with the fault rule for postconviction
relief and for suppression remedies. This process of shifting legal meaning in the absence of
statutory change suggests again that the relative strength of the fault rule even under AEDPA has
been a function of judicial preference rather than the plain meaning of the statutory text.
Section 2254(d)(1) was first interpreted by the Supreme Court in the 2000 case of Terry
Williams v. Taylor to permit merits consideration of a habeas petitioner’s claim only when “the
state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if
174
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the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially
indistinguishable facts,” or alternatively, when the state court “identifies the correct governing
legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of
the prisoner's case.”180 While this standard might sound demanding, the Williams plurality
expressly rejected an even harsher circuit court gloss on § 2254(d)(1) to the effect that “a statecourt judgment is ‘unreasonable’ (and hence invalid) only if all reasonable jurists would agree
that the state court was unreasonable, and granted habeas relief.”181
But over the subsequent fifteen years, Court has recalibrated the meaning of AEDPA
deference, and adopted that lower-court standard, despite Congress’s failure to amend §
2254(d)(1).182 By 2011, Justice Kennedy could say on behalf of a supermajority of the Court that
habeas relief was warranted for legal error under AEDPA only if “there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with this Court's
precedents.”183 Subsequent to that reformulation of the § 2254(d)(1) standard, the Court further
narrowed the availability of review by holding that the “clearly established” federal law relevant
to the § 2254(d)(1) inquiry encompassed only decisions handed down when the state court ruled,
rather than when that ruling became final.184 Rather than being closely divided, this decision was
unanimous: The fault rule is uncontroversial across ideological lines in the habeas context, that
is, just as it is uncontroversial in the constitutional tort and (sometimes) in the evidentiary
suppression contexts. Accordingly, there is a wide consensus within the Court that habeas relief
should be available now only where a petitioner can demonstrate “the exceptional
blameworthiness of the state” 185 —a state of affairs that parallels developments in the
constitutional tort and the exclusionary rule contexts.
In sum, the present crystallization of the fault rule in postconviction habeas is a function
of judicial rather than congressional preferences. This fact points toward one further inference
worth developing here: The fault rule is a function of judicial interests and preferences, including
a worry about caseload, rather than an expression of legislative will. As early as 1953, Justice
Jackson worried about the demoralizing effect of a “flood” of habeas cases.186 The worry did not
abate over time. To the contrary, the volume of habeas petitions increased by more than one third
between the mid-1970s and the late 1989 Teague rule.187 The same year that Teague was
decided, Justice Kennedy (albeit writing in dissent) warned that against decisions that would

180

Terry Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412–413 (2000).
Id. at 377 (discussing the interpretation of § 2254(d)(1) applied in Green v. French, 143 F.3d 865, 870 (4th Cir.
1998) (emphasis added)).
182
For a detailed account of this process, see Huq, Habeas, supra note 9, at 536-41.
183
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011) (stating further that only “extreme malfunctions in the state
criminal justice system” warrant relief (citation omitted)). Although Richter was not unanimous, it has been cited
approvingly in subsequent unanimous opinions. invocations of the Richter standard. See, e.g., Nevada v. Jackson,
133 S. Ct. 1990, 1992 (2013) (per curiam); Metrish v. Lancaster, 133 S. Ct. 1781, 1787 (2013).
184
Greene v. Fisher, 132 S. Ct. 38, 45 (2011).
185
Huq, Habeas, supra note 9, at 581.
186
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 537 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) (““It must prejudice the occasional
meritorious application to be buried in a flood of worthless ones. He who must search a haystack for a needle is
likely to end up with the attitude that the needle is not worth the search.”).
187
BRANDON L. GARRETT & LEE KOVARSKY, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS: EXECUTIVE DETENTION AND POSTCONVICTION LITIGATION 135 (2013) (presenting data on state postconviction filings between 1941 and 2010).
181

27

“increase prisoner litigation and add to the burden on the federal courts.”188 Further, during the
1980s both Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Powell frequently spoke out about the costs of
habeas in terms of delay, especially in the capital penalty context. 189 Simultaneously,
administration officials such as the Attorney General decried “the flood of habeas corpus
petitions engulfing our federal courts.”190 The story recounted here—in which a fault rule is
adopted at the Court’s urging and then gradually rendered more onerous through common-law
recalibration—is one that is most easily explained, at least in substantial part, by the institutional
interests of the judiciary.
E.

Summary

This Part has identified a fault rule that plays a gatekeeping function across a
transubstantive space of individualized constitutional remedies. In seeking damages for a
constitutional torts, the suppression of unconstitutionally secured evidence, or relief from an
unconstitutionally imposed criminal conviction, an individual claimant must often demonstrate
not just that the Constitution was violated, but that the violation was an especially clear and
especially unambiguous one. Fault of this kind requires a showing that a respondent official did
not violate a constitutional law, but that he or she blew past a foundational rule that he or she
should have well known. Absent such fault, the individual petitioning for relief from a discrete
official act infringing on constitutional rights is typically not only denied a remedy, but even a
plenary day in court. The transubstantive and transdoctrinal fault rule identified here, in short, is
highly effective at rationing out judicial resources, as well as installing a buffer from liability for
state officials treading close to the law’s edge.
In recounting the history and development of this fault rule, I have further stressed two
points. First, I have intimated a point to be developed in full in Part II: that the rule is a judicial
creation, and not an emanation of congressional will. The Court has used doctrine to “to
communicate … policy preferences” to lower courts, not to enforce congressional preferences.191
This observation provides a point of departure for Part II’s analysis of the etiology of the fault
rule. Second, I have also pointing in passing to evidence suggesting that the institutional
concerns of the federal judiciary in part motivated adoption of this fault rule. Again, amplifying
188
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and exploring the implicit political economy at work here is a thread of argument to be taken up
in Part II.
II.

The Causal Link Between Remedial Rationing and Judicial Independence

This Part advances the causal claim that fault, as a regulative principle for rationing
scarce judicial resources, finds at least some causal foundation in the institutional independence
of the federal judiciary above and beyond the ideological and policy-focused concerns that
immediately spring to mind. I develop four lines of argument for thinking that judicial
independence—understood as the federal judiciary’s autonomy, rather than as a characteristic of
any individual judge—has played a role in catalyzing the fault-based rationing of constitutional
remedies. First, building on the evidence presented in Part I, I repudiate arguments for attributing
fault’s contours to the Court, rather than to Congress or the strategic behavior of litigants.
Second, I suggest reasons for concluding that the doctrinal developments described in Part I were
not motivated wholly by ideological change on the Court. These two lines of arguments clear
space for alternative explanations focused on institutional interests. Thus, the third argument I
develop is a historical account of those institutional interests that adds context and affirmative
circumstantial evidence for attributing the fault rule to judicial independence. Finally, I present a
powerful piece of circumstantial evidence: The fault rule does not encompass all forms of
constitutional remediation, and its scope is well explained by institutional, not ideological,
interests.
A.

Fault as a Judicial or a Congressional Rule

The first piece of evidence linking the gatekeeping fault rule for individual constitutional
remedies to the institutional interests of the federal judiciary is to be found in the origin of that
rule: As Part I suggested, it is impossible to attribute the fault rule’s emergence to legislative
initiative. To the contrary, it has emerged from judicial sources through common-law
adjudication, albeit with occasional support from the legislative branch of the federal
government. Moreover, I shall argue here, this fault rule cannot be ascribed merely to the
different incentives and resources of litigants, which is a staple in scholarly explanations of
litigation outcomes.
1.

Fault as a Legislative Imposition?

One implication result of the analysis offered in Part I is that Congress, notwithstanding
its formally plenary control of federal courts jurisdiction,192 plays little direct role in crafting
constitutional remedies.193 That analysis shows that at least in the individual remedies domain,
Congress’s influence is notable mainly by its absence. This is true in regard to both the creation
and the evisceration of remedies. To be sure, Congress was responsible for enacting both a civil
damages remedy against state for constitutional violations in 1871 and a postconviction habeas
192
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writ in 1867.194 But both remedies lay dormant for three-quarters of a century before being
revived by the Court. And, as Part I demonstrated at length, the subsequent contraction of habeas
review, the exclusionary rule, and constitutional tort actions has also largely been the work of the
courts rather than Congress.195 This is most obviously so with qualified immunity, a doctrine
unembarrassed by any purchase in the statutory text, has been openly motivated by the Court’s
own “considerations of public policy” since the 1970s.196 That doctrine, as James Pfander has
noted, “represent[s] a remarkable exercise of judicial creativity,” not an exemplar of legislative
control.197
This is not to say that Congress plays no role at all. In some respects, Congress has
seconded the Court’s campaign to constrain individual constitutional remedies. But its main
interventions, AEPDA and the Prison Litigation Reform Act198 were enacted in 1996—many
years after the main elements of the fault-based regime described in Part I.199 As Part I.D.
explored at length, AEDPA’s role in catalyzing the fault rule in habeas is overstated: That rule,
now embodied in § 2254(d)(1) was anticipated by Justice Thomas four years before AEDPA was
enacted, and the effective force of § 2254(d)(1) gatekeeping system has fluctuated over time as
the Court has taken an increasingly miniatory view of the postconviction writ over time. To
understand AEDPA’s installation of fault in § 2254(d)(1) as a de facto delegation to the Court,
which would then independently calibrate that rule is, moreover, consistent with the statute’s
legislative history, which is ambiguous, conflicted, and far less amenable to unilaterally statist
readings than the Court has sometimes suggested.200
But in other respects, Congress has either been rebuffed or taken a more lenient view of
constitutional plaintiffs than the Court. On the one hand, on some occasions, Congress
intervenes, seemingly to promote a trend a majority of the Court has already endorsed, and its
intrusion is deemed by the Justices to be an insult to judicial suzerainty over constitutional
interpretation. Justices, not legislators, therefore have the last word for all practical purposes over
the remedial dispensation. In the wake of Miranda v. Arizona,201 for example, Congress directed
that a statement made by a defendant in custody “shall be admissible in evidence if it is
voluntarily given.”202 In Dickerson v. United States, however, the Court notoriously held that
Congress could not supersede Miranda because the latter had announced a “constitutional
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rule,”203 a ruling that rested upon “a strong statement of judicial supremacy in constitutional
interpretation” rather than a shared hermeneutic responsibility.204
On yet other occasions, Congress has been more solicitous of plaintiffs seeking
constitutional remedies than the Court. For example, rather than narrowing Bivens, Congress has
taken care to preserve that remedy when regulating government liability in tort via the Westfall
Act.205 The Westfall Act virtually immunizes federal government officials from state common
law tort liability, substituting the government as a defendant upon the issuance of a certification
by the Attorney General. Congress, however, expressly declared the exclusivity rule inapplicable
to suits brought against government officials “for a violation of the Constitution of the United
States,”206 a category that most obviously reaches Bivens actions. In short, even in limiting
governmental liability, Congress was careful to preserve individual officer suits created by the
Court. This is in striking contrast to the Court’s approach, which has been largely hostile to
Bivens actions.207
A possible rejoinder to this line of argument might start from the observation that the
doctrinal changes canvassed in Part I are a function not of judicial preferences, but instead
should be attributed to Congress because any discretionary policy-making by the Court operates
in the shadow of legislative correction.208 On this view, it is impossible in the absence of a
constitutional ruling to attribute doctrinal change to judicial preferences because given the
omnipresent possibility of legislative correction. I am not persuaded, however, that it is
infeasible to make inferences about judicial preferences. The concern about judicial decisions
merely anticipate Congress’s preferences is deeply flawed both as a theoretical and an empirical
matter.
As a theoretical matter, it fails to account for the nature of legislation produced by a
bicameralism legislative system attended by a presidential veto. A now canonical body of work
in political science demonstrates that in any political system with “many veto players separated
by large ideological distance … legislation can only be incremental.” 209 Moreover, as the
complexity, difficulty, and enactment costs of legislative specification rise, legislators will tend
more and more to delegate decisions rather than resolving hard questions themselves.210 As a
result, “[t]he constitutional process for enacting legislation, which requires all legislative
proposals to pass through two chambers of Congress and be presented to the President (or, in the
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event of a presidential veto, to survive supermajority votes in the House and Senate), provides
considerable protection for federal jurisdiction.”211
As an empirically matter, the argument from legislative dominance grossly overstates the
efficacy of congressional control. As Tara Grove has documented, “from the late nineteenth
century to the present day demonstrates that the lawmaking procedures of Article I have
repeatedly safeguarded the federal judiciary.”212 Widening the lens, empirical work by William
Eskridge and others shows the probability of congressional override to be diminishing over time,
with successful legislation characterized by bipartisan efforts at updating regulatory policy,
rather than controversial and divisive “corrections” of Supreme Court errors.213 There is little
cause for a Court with its own policy preferences over a controversial domain such as
constitutional remedies, that is, to beat to windward under the influence of anticipated legislative
intervention.
2.

Fault as an Outcome of Litigant Incentives?

If legislative incentives do not predict or explain the use of fault to ration constitutional
remedies, is there some other factor exogenous to the federal courts that might do explanatory
work? More than forty years ago, Marc Galanter pointed out that “[r]epeat play” litigants, who
are able to identify relatively technical issues upon which liability turns, will, all else being
equal, prevail more frequently than one-shot claimants. 214 Consistent with this insight, the
Solicitor General acting on behalf of the United States enjoys an unusual success rates in the
Court,215 and is perhaps uniquely situated to stymie effective channels of constitutional redress.
Can then the fault rule be attributed to the ability of government litigants to coordinate with low
transaction costs, to select favorable test cases for certiorari review, and to persist where
individual litigants might sag?
The short answer is no. Litigant resources cannot explain the emergence and migration of
fault that was described in Part I for a number of reasons. First, it is easy to overstate the
government’s success rate (especially of late),216 and to forget that there are organized interest
groups on the other side of many constitutional rights issues, ranging from property rights
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advocates to organizations promoting the interests of distinct racial and ethnic groups. To say
that government always wins because it is a repeat player, that is, is to ignore the countervailing
pressures, not to mention the plain fact that the government does not uniformly win across the
substantive and remedial board. Second, many of the pivotal changes to the doctrine have been
effected sua sponte by the federal courts, rather than flowing from prolonged litigation
campaigns by organized government interests. Recall for example that the catalyst for the first
iteration of a good faith rule in the exclusionary rule contest was the Court’s decision to add a
question to a certiorari petition presenting a Fourth Amendment issue.217 In the habeas context,
the Court initially rejected the narrowest reading of § 2254(d)(1), and then of its own initiative
tightened up that standard in a series of cases in which no party demanded such increased
scrutiny.218
In short, reliance on congressional preferences or litigant asymmetries is persuasive in
neither as a theoretical matter or as a matter of fit with the observed processes of doctrinal
change. The gatekeeping rule for constitutional remedies is better understood as a function of
judicial preferences.
B.

Judicial Ideology as a Cause of Remedial Rationing

A considerable body of scholarship identifies the ideological roots of changes to
constitutional doctrine in the late 1970s and 1980s as the Warren Court gave way to the Burger
and the Rehnquist Courts.219 In the light of that scholarship, the development of fault might be
explained in simple ideological terms: The Court became more conservative as President Nixon
and other Republicans made more appointments.220 It was also aware of, and sensitive to,
changes in the crime rate in that period—changes that confirmed the worries of new conservative
appointees.221 And perhaps—most cynically and crassly—one might suppose that some of the
new Justices were less than sympathetic to certain populations’ constitutional claims.222 Given
the overlapping influences of ideology, concerns about crime control, and racialized politics, it
might be though that there is no room for an account focused on the institutional interests of the
Supreme Court. Making a place for institutional interests, therefore, requires some response to
reductive accounts of doctrinal change.
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My aim in this section is to demonstrate that whatever role ideology—whether subtly or
crassly defined—played, it cannot explain wholesale the development of the fault rule. That is, I
do not doubt that the changing composition of the Court over the 1970s and 1980s influenced the
development of the case-law. I do doubt that ideology, or the politics of crime and race, is the
whole story.223 The primary evidence for my claim to this effect is simple: Key precedent in all
three lines of cases is not characterized by sharp ideological division. Instead, in the qualified
immunity and habeas precedent in particular, there is a surprising frequency of supermajoritarian
and even unanimous opinions. Further, the rate of dissent seems to diminish rapidly over time
with an alacrity that is not well explained by appointment-driven change. Hence, the distribution
of votes on the Court is hard to square with purely ideological accounts. I first work through this
evidence, and then adduce a series of supplemental reasons for resisting crassly ideological
accounts.
Consider first qualified immunity. The fons et origo of much modern qualified immunity
doctrine is Pierson v. Ray, an opinion by Chief Justice Earl Warren from which only Justice
Douglas dissented.224 Butz v. Economou,225 which intimated the functional basis for qualified
immunity and extended that immunity to federal officials, attracted dissents only from Justices
who would have applied absolute immunity. The Court’s full-bore adoption of a functionalist
logic in Harlow v. Fitzgerald similarly attracted only the lone protest of Chief Justice Burger,
from a statist, pro-defendant perspective.226 The creation of absolute immunity for prosecutors in
Imbler v. Pachtman, once more, elicited only a concurrence from Justices White, Brennan, and
Marshall that largely approved of “the judgment of the Court and … much of its reasoning.”227
Today, the majority of applications of qualified immunity elicit not just a majority, but
unanimity, from the Court.228 For example, Justice Scalia’s statement in 2011 that qualified
immunity shelters “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law”
elicited no protests from the liberal wing of the Court, despite its distance from the qualified
immunity doctrine of even the Burger Court. 229 Simply put, qualified immunity—
notwithstanding its potentially significant normative and distributive effects—is beyond debate
at least within the precincts of the current Court.
There have been instances, to be sure, in which liberal Justices resisted the increasingly
calcification of constitutional tort law via qualified immunity, but this resistance was to prove
short lived. In Anderson v. Creighton, for example, Justices Stevens, Brennan, and Marshall
criticized “the Court’s (literally unwarranted) extension of qualified immunity,” noting that the
Fourth Amendment’s rule of probable cause already provided officers with ample breathing
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room.230 By 2014, however, Anderson had become sufficiently routinized that liberal Justices not
only joined opinions that cited its rule, but agreed to per curiam reversals on its basis.231 And
where the application of the demanding Anderson rule elicits dissents, it is a supermajority of
Justices that includes both liberals and conservatives to be found insisting on a harsh application
of that rule.232 In short, there is little reason to gloss the emergence of qualified immunity as a
doctrinal change associated with the conservative, pro-law-and-order wing of the Court. Rather,
that doctrine has long had substantial cross-ideological support—support that has only deepened
over time.
Qualified immunity doctrine yields one further item of evidence that suggests the role of
institutional, rather than ideological, concerns in shaping the law. In 2001, the Court held in
Saucier v. Katz that courts engaged in a qualified immunity analysis had to follow a certain
sequence of analysis starting with a mandatory “initial inquiry” into whether a constitutional rule
had been violated before any determination of clearly established law.233 Writing for the Court in
Saucier, Justice Kennedy explained that this analytic sequence would facilitate “the process for
the law's elaboration from case to case”234 and hence ensure expeditious development of clearly
established rules to serve as a predicate for constitutional tort liability. Yet eight years later, the
Court in Pearson v. Callahan unanimously abandoned the Saucier sequencing rule in favor of a
rule that allowed lower courts to forego the “initial inquiry” into the law in favor of a ruling on
whether a “clearly established” rule had been violated.235 Because this reversal has the effect of
decelerating the rate at which constitutional rules become clearly established, it not only
increases the chances that a plaintiff subject to Pearson rule will lose but also diminishes the
chances that many other future plaintiffs will lose for want of a clearly established rule.
Pearson is telling not merely because it was unanimous, but because it was liberal
Justices, led by Justice Breyer, who launched the call for Saucier’s reconsideration—and did so
on the basis of institutional consideration. Hence, Justice Breyer in 2004 criticized Saucier on the
ground that “when courts' dockets are crowded, a rigid ‘order of battle’ makes little
administrative sense.”236 In 2007, he reiterated his concern that the rule was “wasting judicial
resources.”237 That is, it was a liberal Justice who pressed first and most urgently for the larger
application of qualified immunity’s fault rule in a way that predictability would conduce to less
clearly established law and fewer constitutional tort recoveries. And that Justice did so expressly
out of institutional concerns related to his conception of the federal judiciary’s sound operation.
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Qualified immunity doctrine, in short, embodies powerful evidence that ideological
considerations do not exhaust the causal forces motivating the rise and currently hegemonic
status of fault-based gatekeeping rules.
A similar tale of ideological convergence can be told in respect to habeas jurisprudence.
At least in the last decade or so, ideological conflict over habeas—as opposed to over the death
penalty—a distinct matter often entangled in habeas cases—has almost wholly abated with both
liberal and conservative Justices to praise and enforce a fault-based regime. It is certainly true
that early cases installing fault-based gatekeeping rules elicited dissents. For example, the
Court’s 2000 ruling on the meaning of §2254(d)(1)’s gatekeeping rule was highly fractured.238
Even then, it is worth emphasizing the supermajority quality of many opinions. The pivotal
decision of Wainwright v. Sykes,239 which installed one of the first fault-based rules for habeas,
was hence seven-two, with only Justices Brennan and Marshall dissenting.240
Yet ideological division has proved remarkably evanescent. Even as the Court has
ratcheted up the intensity of the fault threshold for habeas, the Court has coalesced into a united
front in demanding that habeas petitioners satisfy Harrington’s more onerous and demanding
version of the statutory fault rule241 that was rejected by in 2000 by the Court at a time when it
had more Republican appointees.242 Nor is Harrington an outlier:243 There is a remarkable series
of unanimous decisions in which the unanimous Court, often acting per curiam, has reversed
habeas decisions without briefing or oral argument based on the petitioner’s failure to show
sufficient fault.244 These cases show that the fault rule is so uncontroversial among all the
Justices, whether liberal or conservative, that they are willing to jettison their ordinary rule
against error correction.245 The trajectory of habeas jurisprudence, in short, speaks to the strength
of institutional as opposed to ideological motives as a causal force.246
Finally, consider the exclusionary rule. A fault rule for suppression remedies was
justified first in judicial economy terms, not in overdeterrence terms. Hence, in a pre-Leon
concurrence, Justice White argued that a fault-based limitation in suppression remedies would
yield a “reduction in the number of cases which will require elongated considerations of the
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probable cause question.”247 Nevertheless, the evidence of ideological polarization over the
exclusion clause is weaker than in qualified immunity and habeas contexts. But it is not absent.
Whereas early cases such as Leon attracted multiple dissents,248 more recent opinions, such as
Arizona v. Evans, have attracted smaller dissents.249 And the Court’s most recent extension of
Leon in Heien v. North Carolina has accrued only a single dissent.250
In short, a careful examination of the caseload does not support the conclusion that faultbased remedial rationing is a consequence of ideological change alone. Although ideology and
concern about crime have certainly been salient, they do not capture the whole story: Justices
repeatedly emphasize caseload and judicial economy concerns in regard to habeas, suppression
remedies, and constitutional tort. And the coalitions observed in the jurisprudence belie any
simple ideological account. Consistent with this ideological variation, not all of the doctrines
canvassed above concern constitutional challenges typically favored by liberal Justices and
disfavored by conservative Justices. Challenges to state taxes, for example, lack any obvious
ideological valence and yet are hedged by a species of the fault rule.251 A Bivens claim subject to
qualified immunity is available just as much to a rancher infuriated by meddling federal land
officials as a racial minority subject to harassing and intrusive federal policing.252 To boil the
case-law to ideology, in short, is to fail to take seriously the Court qua court, to ignore the
statements of the Justices, and to blink to observed patterns of judicial coalition-formation. It is
to impose a crude functionalism on a Court that, in practice, is much more supple.
C.

Circumstantial Evidence of the Institutional Roots of the Fault Rule

To claim that courts—rather than legislators or litigants have been responsible for the
ascendency of fault is to assert that federal judges have had both institutional means and
sufficient motives to install the regime described in Part I. There is, however, considerable
historical and contemporaneous empirical evidence of both means and motive. Marshaling that
evidence, I advance two points here to support the causal link between judicial independence and
fault-based rationing of constitutional remedies. First, notwithstanding the clichéd image of a
federal judiciary as weak and dependent upon the political branches, 253 historians have
developed an account of the federal judiciary as an institution that as a branch has accreted
gradually a great deal of autonomous discretion to pursue institutional interests.254 Second,
empirical work identifies caseload management as a core institutional interest of the federal
judiciary. Vindicating institutional autonomy in the federal judicial context, therefore, translates
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as managing the flow of cases. Focusing on the period of time in which the fault rule
developed—the late 1970s and early 1980s—in particular reveals considerable circumstantial
evidence that the Justices viewed constitutional remediation as problematic in caseload terms.
Both the judiciary’s means and its motives for fault-based remedial rationing, in short, are amply
supported by available evidence.
1.

The Judiciary’s Institutional Interest in Caseload Management

Consider first the historical trajectory of branch-level independence. At the time of the
Founding, the constitutional text vested Congress with broad formal authority over the
jurisdictional structure and funding of the federal courts. 255 Nevertheless, post-Founding
developments rendered that such authority increasingly formal rather than real. Rather than a
function of constitutional text, therefore, judicial independence at a branch level has emerged as
a result of institutional developments over the long run of American history.256 There was
nothing inevitable or necessary, moreover, about this development. Rather, institutional
pathways in historical time are contingent matters, vulnerable to the accidents of personality and
exogenous shocks. Regardless of the particular pathway taken, however, it is inevitable that an
institution crafted in a handful of words in 1789 would evolve, mutate, and even metastasize in
unexpected ways over two hundred years of historical time.257
Recent historical work zeroes in upon the first part of the twentieth century as a turning
point. During this period, the federal judiciary successfully lobbied Congress to delegate
important authority over key jurisdictional and administrative powers to the bench. In 1922, for
example, Congress created the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges,258 a modest entity later to
develop into the Judicial Conference of the United States, a full-scale bureaucracy with statutory
authority to lobby by “submit[ting] to Congress . . . its recommendations for legislation.”259 In
1925, Chief Justice William Howard Taft engaged in “unprecedented efforts” to lobby Congress
into granting the Supreme Court almost unfettered discretion over its caseload, near plenary
authority to set its own agenda, and freedom to determine how and why it would intervene on
matters of national salience.260 In 1934, Congress “was compelled to delegate power to the
Court” to set rules for the judiciary in the Rules Enabling Act, signaling that “the federal
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judiciary had arrived as a power player in the national political scene.”261 The subsequent
creation of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts further weakened executive branch
influence on the judiciary.262 Over this period, the executive branch also extended support to the
judiciary, which it viewed as a vehicle for pursuing its own political agenda, in effect checking
congressional leverage of jurisdictional controls.263 The net result of these accumulated reforms
was to empower the judiciary with the institutional instruments and procedural avenues to pursue
its (self-defined interests).
Capturing this rise in branch-level judicial independence, the political scientist Kevin
McGuire has assembled a longitudinal index of the federal judiciary’s institutionalization.264 This
index bundles measures of the Supreme Court’s institutional differentiation from other federal
entities, the durability of its interests, and its autonomy from other political forces.265 Measured
over the twentieth century, McGuire’s index evinces a steady upward trend line such that by the
1960s, the Court had become a “distinctive and independent force within the federal
government.”266 McGuire’s conclusion is supported by a second set of studies examining how
the Court exercises judicial review. These studies of time trends in judicial exercise of the power
to invalidate state and federal statutes identifies a peak in the early twentieth century and another
peak from the 1960s through the 1980s.267 To the extent that judicial willingness to invalidate
duly enacted laws is a metric of judicial independence, the late twentieth century marks one of its
high water marks.268
This historical evidence is complemented by a growing body of evidence that judges act
upon the basis of institutional interests determined by their position within Article III. Of course,
it is well known that the policy preferences of appointing presidents powerfully shape the
261
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distribution of federal judicial candidates presented to and confirmed by the Senate.269 A recent
empirical study by Thomas Keck thus concludes that judicial motivations “are shaped in part by
a sense of institutional duty.”270 Keck examined three possible explanations for the Supreme
Court’s decision to invalidate federal statutes—partisan differences, policy disagreements, and
institutional disagreements. Contra accounts that focus on the partisan drivers of judicial review,
Keck concluded that “more than sixty percent” of federal laws struck down between 1981 and
2005” are “consistent with” an institutional account of judicial review in which the Justices are
“motivated by the desire to defend judicial authority against incursions from the other
branches.” 271 In contrast, “[m]ost” of instances of judicial review in that time period “fit
uneasily” with a policy or partisan differences account. 272 Keck’s study concerns federal
statutory invalidations, not the regulation of state criminal justice systems. But it would be
extraordinary if the Justices’ preferences varied not just in quality but also in kind between
different domains. There is therefore no reason to think that his inferences do not extend to the
doctrinal areas discussed here.
If the judiciary possesses both a degree of autonomy from other branches and also a
distinct understanding of its institutional interests, it becomes necessary to identify those
interests. Theoretical, empirical, and self-reported data from the federal bench demonstrates that
moderating the flow of cases, and in particular requests for constitutional remedies, comprises a
central element of the Article III judiciary’s institutional interests.
At a theoretical level, Judge Richard Posner has posited “leisure” as a central element in
the judicial utility function.273 Empirical studies confirm Posner’s intuition. These show that
federal judges, like any other supplier of labor, are averse to excessive demands on their time.274
Because these demands are determined on an institution-wide basis, it follows that federal judges
must attend to their individual interest in minimizing unwanted effort through doctrinal tools that
are systemic in character. Consistent with both the narrow and the broad interpretation of
institutional interests, both liberal and conservative Justices alike express concern about the
ability of the federal courts to fulfill their adjudicative role given rising caseloads.275 This ability
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is threatened by rising caseloads, which have already overwhelmed courts’ ability to give
individualized consideration to every discrete matter, and led to the substitution of law clerk and
staff attorney consideration in lieu of Article III eyes.276
The theoretical and empirical evidence aligns with the historical record and self-reports
from the Justices. By the 1980s, judges and scholars uniformly defined the problem of “judicial
reform” as primarily a “problem … of workload”277 This results in a series of commissions,
starting with the Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme Court created by Chief Justice
Warren Burger in 1971, to analyze backlogs in judicial business” and “inadequacies in judicial
organization.” 278 The Study Group and its successors the Commission on Revision of the
Appellate System and the Hruska Commission, failed to catalyze legislative action, but
nonetheless “raised awareness” of the caseload concern.279 Of course, this was the first time that
federal judges had complained of capacity constraints.280 But it seems clear that the late 1970s
and 1980s were a time at which the pressures of adjudication were felt to be especially acute, and
thus a warrant for both study and institutional change.
2.

Caseload Management in the Era of Fault

The late 1970s and early 1980s were distinct in another way: They were the beginning of
a four-fold increase in the rate of incarceration in state and federal prisons.281 At the time, crime
appeared a major, and increasingly serious, national problem. Crime rates had been rising since
the 1960s, with no prospect of a plateau in sight. The national homicide rate, for example, had
doubled in the decade after 1964, and was continuing to rise in 1980.282 Street-level crime was
also perceived as a national problem, warranting responses from national institutions. In 1981,
for example, the new Attorney General William French Smith, convened a task force to
determine how federal resources could be switched from white-collar to street-crime.283 Further,
“[i]n the 1980s and 1990s, criminal justice policy and practice was influenced by the notion that
the country was facing an epidemic of ‘juvenile superpredators.’”284 In short, policy-makers had
cause to believe that crime control would remain a priority for the foreseeable future.
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Federal criminal adjudicative policy shifted accordingly. The absolute volume of federal
criminal defendants had fluctuated substantially since World War II, dropped in the late 1940s
and 1950s due to declining immigration enforcement. But it began “surg[ing] between 1970 and
1977 and then [falling] back temporarily from 1977 to 1980,” before growing “in almost every
year from 1980.”285 Indeed, the “number of federal criminal prosecutions has grown steadily,
with little fluctuation, since 1980, at a rate of about 1,500 additional cases per year” with “a
significant part” of that growth due to “the growing number of controlled substance prosecutions
and stepped-up enforcement against immigration law violators.”286 As a result, the number of
federal offenders imprisoned for drug offenses ballooned from 4900 in 1980 to 98,675 in 2007.287
From the perspective of the Supreme Court in the early 1980s, the then-incipient growth of
federal criminal caseloads might have seemed to portend serious future pressures on federal
dockets.
Given this constellation of factors—most of which would have been readily apparent to
the Justices—it is possible to hypothesize that the incipient pressures of mass incarceration on
the federal courts in the form of greatly increased volumes of suppression motions and habeas
petitions—and not merely the direct effects of crime—were not lost on the Court even at the
beginning of the 1980s. Hence, during the period at which the fault rule was developed, the
Court was at the acme of its institutional autonomy, and also inclined by habit and instruction to
view the volume of litigation as not just a problem, but the defining problem for the federal
courts. That problem, finally, likely seemed most pressing in the criminal law domain, where
increasing reliance on the carceral state to solve social problems produced larger and larger
caseload pressures on the federal judiciary.288
Can the rise of fault be explained as a response to rising crime rates without regard to the
freestanding institutional concerns of the judiciary? There are a number of reasons for resisting
this reductive conclusion. First, as already recounted,289 the gatekeeping fault rule did not emerge
solely at the behest of Justices appointed by presidents centrally concerned with crime control.
Rather, it has been a bipartisan project.
Second, while Justices have
1950s repeatedly articulated their
judiciary’s institutional interest in
statements, ranging from Justice

expressed concern with crime control, they have since the
resistance to constitutional remediation in terms of the
caseload management. Part II.B contains many of these
White’s early concerns about the Fourth Amendment
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suppression remedy 290 to Justice Breyer’s concern about the burden of constitutional tort
litigation in the lower courts.291 There is no reason to view these statements as disingenuous or
simply false. Nor are such judicial expressions of concern over the institutional effects of
constitutional remedies isolated. In respect to each line of ex post remedies doctrine examined
above, Justices have expressed concern about the manageability of litigation flows absent
something like a fault rule. In the constitutional tort context, for example, Justice Black
articulated a concern with “frivolous” suits in his Bivens dissent.292 In the habeas context,
concerns about the “disproportionate amount of [judicial] time and energy” required for
postconviction review have long been stock complaints.293 And recently installed limits to the
exclusionary rule have been underwritten by worries about the “constant flood of alleged
failures” to conform to the apparently rococo details of the Fourth Amendment.294 Remedial
reform is thus perceived by the Justices themselves as a function of the rising demand for
adjudication, a demand that is most plausibly linked to the recent growth and expected continued
growth of the punitive, policing, and incarcerating state.
Evidence from the Justices’ own lips, moreover, undermines another potential counterargument to effect that a fault rule cannot be explained by caseload concerns because such a rule
would not influence the behavior of habeas petitioners, the public defenders who represent most
criminal defendants, or those aggrieved by perceived governmental abuse. The Leon Court, for
example, worried that the availability of suppression would diminish the rate of pleabargaining.295 Empirical evidence that this is not so has done nothing to dent the force of the
fault rule in the Fourth Amendment context. 296 Setting the effect of suppression on plea
bargaining to one side, though, it is hard to believe that the fault rule has not altered the
incentives of plaintiffs’ attorneys dependent on contingency fee payoffs, public defenders
determining how to ration scarce time and resources,297 or prisoners who may face real trade offs
in respect to how to allocate time and effort within prison.298 And even if the magnitude of these
effects is in question, a fault rule might have distinctive appeal to the Justices because it a legal
intervention that has a clear judicial pedigree and feel, unlike (say) changes to substantive
290
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criminal law or the funding of either prosecutors’ or criminal defenders’ offices. It is not
implausible, that is, to think of fault as an obvious first resort for a judge steeped in common law
ideas seeking to manage docket pressures.299 Finally, it is worth emphasizing that concerns about
crime and judicial capacity not only can be complementary but can also interact: If institutional
concerns were all that mattered, for example, it might simply have altered substantive law to be
more favorable to plaintiffs, thereby encouraging higher settlement rates, or imposed
constitutional constraints on substantive criminal law. Concern with crime removes these
possibilities from the judicial agenda, and pushes the Court to deploy statist instruments to
manage its dockets.
In tracing a causal chain from the political and social facts of mass incarceration to
judicial doctrine, my argument here contrasts, and conflicts with William Stuntz’s revered
criticism of the Warren Court’s criminal procedure cases. Stuntz argued that the judicial
regulation of criminal procedure had a perverse effect because “the very existence of defendantprotective procedural doctrine tends to push toward lower funding and broader substantive
criminal law.”300 In this fashion, Stuntz suggested that doctrinal change conduced to larger
institutional change. Stuntz’s story, however, is hard to square with the chronological evidence.
As Stephen Schulhofer has explained, key changes to criminal sentencing are removed by
decades from the Warren Court’s criminal procedure decisions.301 Further, other Western natures
that experienced the same punitive turn did so without any criminal procedure revolution against
which to react, suggesting that “[p]rofound structural changes in Western industrial society lay at
the heart of these developments, not judicial doctrine.”302 But Schulhofer does not ask the logical
next question: Did those “profound structural changes” influence doctrine in ways that alter the
distribution, and at times the existence, of constitutional remediation? And if so, what mediated
those effects? The argument developed here suggests that it did via the judiciary’s institutional
concerns. For there is good reason to think that even if the Court has not shaped the development
of criminal justice institutions, the latter have directly impinged upon its ability to respond to
constitutional wrongs.
The Court, in short, had both the means and the motivation to translate its institutional
autonomy into a fault-based regime of remedial rationing. Both historical and contemporaneous
evidence suggest that judges define their interests in institutional terms, and that managing the
federal courts’ caseload is central to their conception of this institutional interest. Against this
backdrop, the innovations charted in Part I may have seemed logical ways of vindicating the
institutional independence of the federal judiciary. This diagnosis further suggests that the
installation of the fault rule will prove relatively durable regardless of the ideological preferences
of the next president to engage in significant appointments to the Court. Liberal or conservative,
new Justices are likely to experience and endorse institutional perspectives on docket and caseload management just as their ideological confreres have. To look to changing patterns of
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judicial appointment as a solvent of remedial rationing in the constitutional context, therefore,
may be whistling in the wind.
D.

Institutional Interests and the Boundaries of the Fault Rule

There is one final argument for glossing the fault rule as a function of institutional
preferences, and not just as a grossly ideological effect. Under current doctrine, fault plays a
regulative role with respect to some—but not all—channels of judicial review. Where it applies,
fault operates as a tax on constitutional claim-making. It thereby disincentivizes claims. Where it
does not apply, the absence of a fault rule is in effect a subsidy, making such challenges more
attractive. By shifting the boundaries of fault, the Court elicits and also tamp down on different
forms of claim-making. An examination of the contours of the Court’s fault-based regime
suggests that the current dispensation is well designed to maximize the federal bench’s prestige
while minimizing its labor costs. That is, the contours of the fault rule correspond to, and thereby
promote, the institutional interests of the judiciary.303
Because this argument turns on some careful parsing of doctrine, I develop it in two
parts: First, I set identify contexts in which the Court has declined to install a fault rule. Second, I
explain how the resulting doctrinal contours can be explained in terms the judiciary’s
institutional interests. This account, while again circumstantial, provides one more item of
circumstantial evidence for attributing fault-based rationing to the exercise of judicial
independence.
1.

Exceptions to the Fault Rule

Recall first that constitutional torts, suppression motions, and habeas petitions do not
exhaust the universe of procedural mechanisms for constitutional claim-making. Courts also
entertain asks for injunctive relief pursuant to Ex Parte Young304 and actions for declaratory
relief.305 Whereas rights claimants seeking relief using the former mechanism must demonstrate
fault,306 litigants seeking the latter forms of relief need not show anything more than the bare fact
of constitutional violation. In a Young action, a defendant might invoke traditional equitable
doctrines of unclean hands307 and undue hardship,308 which both focus on a kind of fault. But
few, if any, reported cases turn on these rules, suggesting that they do not play a large role in
constitutional litigation.309 At least as a general matter, therefore, the availability of equitable
relief in constitutional cases does not turn on fault.
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There is, in short, a difference in the cost of asserting a constitutional right that depends
on which procedural mechanism is employed. The ensuing differential in expected remedial
value is amplified by the simple fact that injunctive and declarative forms of relief—unlike
damages, suppression, or vacatur of a conviction—are typically available prophylactically before
a violation has occurred. 310 Prevention is generally more valuable than post hoc measures that
rarely make plaintiffs entirely whole. As a result, “federal courts frequently entertain actions for
injunctions and for declaratory relief aimed at preventing future activities that are reasonably
likely or highly likely, but not absolutely certain, to take place.”311
The 2013-14 Supreme Court Term provides illustrations. Susan B. Anthony List v.
Driehaus involved a facial First Amendment challenge to an Ohio statute criminalizing false
statements about candidates during political campaigns.312 Even though the only complaint
against the plaintiffs at bar had been dismissed, the unanimous Court discerned a “substantial”
enough “threat of future enforcement” to establish standing.313 The same term, in McCullen v.
Coakley, the Court adjudicated another First Amendment challenges to a Massachusetts law
establishing buffer zones around abortion clinics based on the plaintiffs’ expressed desire to
enter those zones in the future, rather than any past violation of the law. 314 Anticipatory
challenges of this ilk, of course, are not limited to the First Amendment context.315
The doctrine, however, contains another important wrinkle. Not all anticipatory suits are
created equal. There is an important difference between “facial” challenges316 to the verbal
content of laws, such as Susan B. Anthony List and McCullen, and challenges to ongoing
institutional practices. Whereas facial challenges to laws face low hurdles, in City of Los Angeles
v. Lyons, the Court imposed a high, often insurmountable, barrier to challenges to official
practices by dint of a specific element of Article III standing rules.317
To see how, consider the Court’s divergent formulations of plaintiffs’ threshold burdens
in two cases. In Susan B. Anthony List, the plaintiffs satisfied Article III by showing that their
conduct was “‘arguably ... proscribed by [the] statute’ they wish to challenge.”318 Simply based
on the verbal content of the challenged Ohio statute, the unanimous Court had “no difficulty”
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concluding this threshold had been surmounted. 319 In Lyons, a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief
against a police chokehold practice was asked to make “the incredible assertion either, (1) that
all police officers in Los Angeles always choke any citizen with whom they happen to have an
encounter, whether for the purpose of arrest, issuing a citation or for questioning or, (2) that the
City ordered or authorized police officers to act in such manner.”320 Lyons in effect required a
plaintiff challenging a practice to collate a large body of evidence, not just about what the law is,
but about empirical regularities in the world. This is costly, sometimes prohibitively so. Perhaps
unsurprising, a 2000 analysis found that across 1,200 reported decisions applying Lyons, 1152
ended in dismissal on standing grounds.321
To summarize, the Court applies a fault rule to individualized tort actions, suppression
motions, and habeas petitions—all of which challenge granular, singular official acts. No fault
rule, however, applies to requests for prospective injunctive or declaratory relief against
unconstitutional laws. Ex ante challenges to institutional practices, by contrast, while facing no
fault rule, are impeded by Lyons rule. The net result is in some tension with the notional stated
Supreme Court disfavor of hypothetical322 and facial323: requests for constitutional review: a
relative subsidy for prophylactic facial challenges to laws, a relative tax on individualized claims
and ex ante challenges to institutional practices.
2.

Judicial Interests as a Determinant of the Contours of Fault

This doctrinal arrangement can be nicely explained by an account cognizant of the
institutional interests of the judiciary. If we assume that judges’ interests are refracted through an
institutional lens, and thereby focused on managing the federal bench’s workload, that is, current
doctrinal arrangements follow surprisingly closely from this assumption. To begin with, notice
that caseload pressure can be more effectively relieved by regulating the broad river of ex post
remedial demands rather than by staunching the comparatively small number of anticipatory
requests for relief. Ex post remedies tends to be discrete rather than aggregate in nature, and
hence more numerous. Different acts of police misconduct, different trial errors by prosecutors,
and different judicial errors each require distinct suppression hearings, habeas petitions, and
damages awards to determine facts and allocate relief. These accumulate, imposing a rising toll
on judicial economy ambitions. A fault rule that plays a gatekeeping rule (such as qualified
immunity or § 2254(d)(1)) substitutes simple, mechanical protocols at the pretrial stage for
complex, fact-intensive inquiries at trial. This has the effect of reducing trial costs, not to
mention expenditures on the remedies portion of litigation. Even if a fault rule does not reduce
the volume of these cases, it does render their adjudication much easier. It is far easier to
319
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determine whether there has been a clear and unambiguous violation of a constitutional rule than
to determine whether there has been any constitutional violation. This has the supplemental
benefit of enabling delegation to adjuncts such as staff attorneys and law clerks, and thus easing
the labor of adjudication.324
Similarly, the distinction between challenges to laws (such as Susan B. Anthony) and
challenges to institutional practices (such as Lyons) reflects the same concern about the
managerial costs of different remedies.325 A challenge to an institutional practice may require a
remedy that involves ongoing supervision and judicial involvement, whereas a challenge to a
legal text can be resolved by the fiat of a judicial order. By making the former easier to obtain
than the latter, the Court eases the demand for judicial resources. That is, different elements of
the margin are congruent with judicial economy explanations.326
This simple account can be supplemented by considering the bench’s institutional interest
in public reputation.327 A judicial interest in prestige explains both the extent of the fault rule,
and its exceptions. Federal judges have long expressed their belief that “federal courts” are “too
important” for certain kinds of cases.”328 “Petty” cases are repudiated by leading jurists as illsuited to federal adjudication.329 Doctrine and judicial lobbying affirms this belief. For example,
the Court developed through common-law adjudication an “appellate review” model of
administrative agency oversight as a means to avoid being called upon to decide “matters that
were not properly judicial but were rather ‘administrative’ in nature.”330 In effect, the appellate
review model mitigated caseload demands created by the new federal regulatory state.
Federal judges also preserve their prestige by preventing inflation of the federal bench.
Seventy-five years after it refined the appellate review model, the federal judiciary has been
among the most important lobbies in Congress resisting the extension of the prestigious Article
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III badge to bankruptcy judges,331 while at the same time (without discernable irony) invalidating
the latter’s review of state-law tort claims.332 This interest in preserving institutional prestige
aligns with judges’ interest in managing caseloads, pressing federal courts away from the messy,
unrewarding labor of adjudicating discrete, dispersed, and unglamorous constitutional violations.
It justifies instead a priority for high-profile challenges to laws—all the best to reinforce the
impression that federal courts are (or wish to be) high-minded forums of principle, not mere factgrubbers sorting through the detritus of the modern regulatory and police state. Cases such as
Susan B. Anthony List and McCullen are exemplars of a species of prestigious, high-profile suit
that is elicited by leaving unregulated the channels for injunctive or declaratory relief. The
continued supply of these cases creates the impression of a Court diligent in its enforcement of
the Constitution, even though the Court is spared the hard labor of vindicating most “petty”
constitutional claims that arise from quotidian crime control and bureaucratic behavior.
*

*

*

This Part has developed evidence for the hypothesis that the institutional interests of the
judiciary have shaped the emergence of the fault role. I have not tried to show that such interests
are exclusive of other concerns. Rather, I have explored the inadequacy of political and
ideological explanations, and then developed a circumstantial case for attributing some causal
effect to the judiciary’s institutional interest in case management. The net effect, I hope, is to
supply a more rounded, nuanced account of doctrinal change than the mechanically ideological
stories that to date have dominated.
III.

Implications of the Fault Rule for Constitutional Remedies

The primary aim of this Article is to describe how scarce judicial resources are allocated
to the task of constitutional remedies, and to offer a hypothesis about one set of causal forces that
to date have been largely ignored. This Part turns from that descriptive and analytic task to some
normative implications of the causal claim advanced here. To be clear, the causal linkage
between judicial independence and remedial rationing that I have proposed in Parts I and II
raises a host of important normative issues. My aim here is not to resolve all of those question,
but rather to flag what strike me as the most important of them. Hence, I set forth some of the
welfarist and distributive implications of fault-based rationing of remedial resources first, and
then conclude by limning the consequences of the present analysis for standard accounts of the
Separation of Powers.
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A.

Welfarist and Distributive Implications

The descriptive account offered in Parts I and II of this Article have illumined a doctrinal
superstructure that imposes low transaction costs upon ex ante challenges to the verbal content of
laws or regulation, and high transaction costs to both challenges to institutional practices, and
also discrete requests for granular after-the-fact remedies. The latter forms of constitutional
review, therefore, are prioritized over the former. This resulting system of implicit taxes and
subsidies on private behavior has complex welfarist and distributional implications.
Characterization of these effects depends on how one defines social welfare—which is
controversial—and whether one thinks distributional concerns are salient—which is even more
divisive. Rather than trying to answer these deep underlying questions, my aim here is to sketch
briefly how constitutional remedies doctrine might effect valuable social ends without trying to
define conclusively what those goals should be. I focus on three vectors of welfare and
distributional effects from the doctrinal arrangements mapped in this Article that run through,
respectively, different sorts of constitutional errors, different rights, and different litigants. My
aim here in to pronounce judgments on those effects, but simply to elucidate their operation.
First, the Court’s remedial doctrine entails that different kinds of constitutional errors
receive different treatment. On the one hand, a constitutional flaw that is manifest on the face of
a generally applicable statute or regulation, that operates directly against individuals as a primary
rule without the intermediation of any prosecutorial discretion on the part of an enforcing
agency, is most vulnerable to judicial correction. At the other end of the spectrum, a
constitutionally flawed act or practice, unmemorialized in written text and dispersed through
time and space in a sporadic, even stochastic, distribution, cannot be remedied ex ante. Instead, it
will receive only the light review that can be exercised under the anesthetizing regime of the
gross fault rule that covers ex post remedies. Stated otherwise, errors that occur during the
liquidation of standards (which generally occurs after a violation) receive lighter judicial scrutiny
than errors embedded in the formulation of a rule (which typically occurs before the
violation).333 The doctrine hence creates a subtle tilt in favor of standards rather than rules where
a risk of constitutional challenge is present.
Second, variation in the transaction costs of different remedies influences the distribution
of resources available for the enforcement of distinct rights. The fault rule raises the cost of
enforcement where it applies because it demands a more onerous showing by litigants. This
differential in enforcement costs intersects with differences between rights. Some rights are
easier to enforce ex ante with an injunction, while others are easier to enforce ex post by
damages, suppression, or the vacatur of a conviction. Lowering the price of ex ante enforcement
thus favors some rights over others. To pick an uncontroversial example, First Amendment and
Due Process rights related to participation in the democratic process334 are most valuable when
enforced prospectively, and lack obvious commensurable monetary substitutes. After an election
has been resolved, and one candidate is selected over others, there may be no good way to
333
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See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) (“In decision after decision, this Court has made clear
that a citizen has a constitutionally protected right to participate in elections on an equal basis with other citizens in
the jurisdiction); accord Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433-34 (1992); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143
(1972).

50

mitigate fully infringements on democratic participation rights.335 Monetary damages would
strike many as “hopelessly inadequate.”336 Discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause can
also be understood as the failure to treat members of a protected class “with dignity and
respect.”337 Again, compensatory remedies seem poorly fitted to the particular harm of being
treated as less than human. Dignity, perhaps by dint of intrinsic qualities, is not typically thought
to be fungible with cash.
On the other hand, there are many other rights that want for any prophylactic remedy, but
are arguably addressed in a tolerable fashion via damages after the fact. In the takings context,
for example, the Court has stated that that a property owner must pursue compensation through
state procedures before a Fifth Amendment takings claim will “ripen” for the purposes of
federal-court adjudication,338 and has declined to permit any acceleration of takings claims even
when the process of state court adjudication generated preclusive effects that barred federal court
relitigation. 339 This reflects a (perhaps erroneous) belief that ex post remedies are at least
adequate for unconstitutional takings. Even in the absence of formal constraints on ex ante
remedies, moreover, practical and epistemic constraints may also render ex post claims the only
viable pathway. Illegal home searches that generate no inculpatory evidence, for example, may
not be predictable before the fact, but might be redressed only afterward. Indeed, even in
jurisdictions were unconstitutional searches and police violence are endemic, Lyons means the ex
post channels of tort actions, suppression motions, and postconviction relief are the only game in
town. It is this class of rights better suited to ex post enforcement that are disincentivized by the
fault rule.
Finally, differences in remedial access will also differentiate between different categories
of litigants, both on the plaintiff and on the state defendant side. Constitutional rights claimants
are likely sensitive to the costs of judicial enforcement. Litigants’ epistemic and litigation
resources influence the relative costs of different species of judicial remedy. An increase in the
evidentiary showing or procedural hurdles necessary to secure monetary relief, for example, will
therefore reduce the expressed demand for that form of judicial enforcement. The expected value
of injunctive relief will vary, by contrast, depending on the litigant’s ability to anticipate and file
suit prior to a governmental action. Along either margin, litigants’ demand for constitutional
remedies is likely to be elastic.340 Changes in the relative prices of remedies will thus change the
pool of litigants seeking remedies.
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Consider, for example, the Court’s use of the fault rule to increase the cost of enforcing
rights ex post relative to ex ante enforcement in many domains. In expectation, such a change
will depress litigant demand for rights that can only be vindicated through monetary damages. At
the same time, it will increase litigant demand in respect to rights that can only be vindicated
fully by anticipatory intervention. It also lowers the cost of constitutional remediation for
plaintiffs who have the epistemic and social resources to judicial assistance before a violation
occurs, and increases the cost of such remediation for plaintiffs who lack the resources to act
before the state does. Whether one looks at different effects between rights or litigants, therefore
the result is the same: Some litigants gain, while others lose out. Changes to the relative
transaction costs of different remedies is thus a way for judges to change the mix of litigants that
benefit from the expenditure of what is in essence a fixed pool of taxpayer-supported judicial
resources.341 Recalibrating remedies doctrine, in public choice terminology, is a vehicle for
implicitly shifting the allocation of judicial resources between different interest groups. This
redistribution—which is most likely regressive in character—is not free of normative
implications.
Finally, it is not only rights claimants who are treated differently under the current
remedial dispensation. The doctrine also distinguishes between different state defendants. The
current remedial architecture channels judicial resources toward the scrutiny of centralized fonts
of legal authority (such as legislators or regulation-generating agencies), and away from
dispersed, discretion-exercising officials (such as line officials within dispersed bureaucracies,
prosecutors and the police 342 ). Consistent with the decentralizing impulse at the core of
American federalism, the remedial doctrine described here makes it easier to challenge to
concentrated, top-down forms of law-making, and at the same time raises the price of challenges
to dispersed, localized exercises of delegated authority. This result is particularly striking in the
policing context. Recent ethnographies of urban policing have underscored the frequency and
severity of routine violence inflicted by line officers, in particular in African-American
communities.343 It is precisely the lowest visible forms of unconstitutional violence, which effect
many of the least politically powerful communities in the United States, that the Court has
rendered most difficult to remedy. This is consistent with Richard Posner, William Landes, and
Lee Epstein’s general prediction that reduced access to federal courts “weighs most heavily on
persons seeking to expand legal rights [such as] antidiscrimination rights [and] prisoners
rights.”344

enforcement of some individual rights may be inelastic, such that increases in the price of judicial enforcement has
no effect on the volume of litigation.
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Reasonable people will differ about whether these effects on different species of
violations, different rights, and different litigants are warranted or lamentable, just as they
disagree on how to prioritize between rights and litigants. I do not aim to settle those differences
here. Nevertheless, this analysis should underscore the fact that the fault-based gatekeeping
regime for allocating constitutional remedies, along with its doctrinal adjuncts, has significant
downstream effects on important social goals—effects that are perhaps all the more surprising
given the heterogeneous ideological composition of judicial coalitions responsible for that rule.
The subtle way in which these effects arise means that they have never been subject to public
scrutiny or debate. At a minimum, differences in ultimate normative priors should not undermine
the conclusion that such sub rosa redistribution of the benefits that flow from our Constitution
may be problematic simply because of its want of transparency.
B.

Implications for the Separation of Powers

A second implication of this Article’s analysis bites on Separation of Powers theory. The
autonomy of the judiciary has long been conceived as a central plank of the Constitution’s
separation of powers,345 one that fosters important public values such as the vindication of
individual constitutional rights. But the existence of a causal connection between judicial
independence and a fault-based rule for limiting the availability of constitutional relief
complicates the traditional account of the judiciary’s role in the national government. At a
minimum, it shows that the policy effects of judicial independence are more volatile than
generally believed. Read more aggressively, the evidence presented here suggests that the
successful institutionalization of judicial independence can undermine, as much as further, the
project of realizing constitutional rights.
There is a deep-seated belief in American constitutional jurisprudence of a causal
connection between the creation of judicial independence and the vindication of individual
rights. The French political theorist Montesquieu, an influential figure among the Framers,
cautioned that “liberty” would be lost “that if the power of judging is not separate from the
legislative power and from executive power.”346 Introducing the Bill of Rights to the first
Congress, James Madison thus prophesized that “independent tribunals of justice” would act “in
a peculiar manner [as] the guardians of those rights” and “an impenetrable bulwark against every
assumption of power in the Legislative or Executive.”347 On this view, the purpose of judicial
independence is to ensure that cases—especially those involving prized, basic rights—are
decided on their legal merits (however defined) rather than on considerations of naked political
power.348 Echoes of Madison’s confidence in the social value of judicial independence resound
345
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repeatedly today. For example, Judge Deanall Tacha, while serving on the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals channeled conventional wisdom when she pronounced that “the independent federal
judiciary has been a powerful tool in guarding the Constitution and the rights of individuals.”349
Similarly Archibold Cox hardly invited controversy when he called “[a]n independent judiciary
… the best guarantee of liberty and impartial justice against executive oppression and other
executive or bureaucratic abuse.”350 The causal connection between judicial independence and
the vindication of constitutional rights, in short, is for all intents and purposes conventional
wisdom today.
The analysis developed in this Article suggests that conventional wisdom demands
serious caveats. The institutionalization of judicial independence does not lead inexorably to the
vindication of individual constitutional rights. Rather, the effects of endowing the federal courts
with policy autonomy are contingent upon the interests and preferences of judges qua
institutional actors. When judges’ situated interests conduce away from the vindication of
individual liberty interests, judicial independence will promote less, rather than more, respect for
those rights. At least in the contemporary context, the institutional interests of federal judges
have systematically pressed toward a constriction of remedial generosity. The result has been the
transubstantive migration of the fault rule described in Part I.351
Separation of powers theory concerning the judiciary from the Federalist 78 onward has
focused on the negative proposition that judicial independence, and therefore the vindication of
individual rights, simply requires that the courts by free of political influence.352 At least at the
time of the Philadelphia Convention, this causal claim rested on theoretical premises rather than
on experiential foundations. The division of executive and judicial power into two separate
branches of government was a relative novelty in political theory.” 353 Indeed, at least one
element of the salient historical experience—the vigorous deployment of the habeas corpus writ
by the King’s Bench in England at the beginning of the Seventeenth Century—suggested that it
was feasible to have robust judicial oversight of liberty-infringing governmental powers without
the formal accouterments of judicial independence. 354 Notwithstanding this experience,
Separation of Powers theory assumes that the requirement of judicial as well as executive and
legislative involvement in state-sponsored liberty deprivations will serve as a brake on the
overzealous use of coercive power.355
349
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But this is not necessarily so because of the self-defeating effects of institutionalizing
judicial power. On the one hand, elected officials may have strong preferences for liberty that
might be imposed on other, more recalcitrant state actors. Federal politicians, for example,
sought to use federal courts to expand liberties in the teeth of state officials’ opposition.356 The
presence of multiple centers of political power, therefore, introduces the possibility that political
control over the judicial might lead to more libertarian outcomes. On the other if judges’ and
rights-holders’ preference slip out of alignment, judges may fail to pursue libertarian ends, or
may pursue them with suboptimal lethargy. Separation of powers theory, while expressing
inexhaustible concerns about political-branch capture of the judiciary, supplies no mechanism
through which the judiciary’s interests would become aligned with those of constitutional rights
holders.357 And there is simply no a priori reason to think that the preferences of those on the
federal bench will accord with the maximal protection of individual rights. Certainly, the mere
absence of overt and ongoing political control cannot easily be equated with a vigorous passion
for liberty. The case for tethering judicial independence to liberty becomes even more
complicated when the Article II process of judicial selection is examined. For nothing in either
the nomination and confirmation process, or the institutional setting of a court leads inexorably
to a rights-related mission.358 Moreover, it is hard to view the Court’s history dispassionately and
see a consistent and uniform commitment to all constitutional rights.
And it gets worse: The historical and theoretical arguments developed here suggest that
more successful the courts are at building up their institutional autonomy, the more likely they
may be to have distinct corporate interests that are at odds with the interests of constitutional
rights holders. That is, the very conditions that produce institutional stability for courts also
undermine the incentives necessary for judicial vigor in pursuit of individual liberty interests.
Given this trade-off between institutional capacity and institutional incentives, it seems
reasonable to hesitate before assuming that the courts will always and necessary act in accord
with stable libertarian preferences
My analysis of the connection between judicial independence in its contemporary
institutional form and the titration of constitutional remedies suggests that in the contest between
institutional interests and concern for individual liberties, the latter has lost out as a historical
matter. From the institutional perspective of federal courts, the constant stream of complaints
thrown up by defective state courts, deficient police departments, and errant bureaucracies are a
“petty” nuisance.359 The fault-based gatekeeping rule installed in the constitutional tort, habeas,
and exclusionary rule context dramatically cuts down on the quanta of resources courts must
allocate to these nuances. At the same time, it still leaves courts free to deal with more
prestigious and higher profile facial challenges to laws that seek injunctive or declaratory relief.
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Contemporary experience, in summary, suggests that when federal courts are allowed
both the discretion and the instruments to follow through on their institutional preferences, the
doctrinal results can be reduced enforcement of constitutional rights. It can also mean that many
constitutional claimants never even obtain an opportunity to be heard in court, but rather see their
claims deflected via summary pretrial process. This will inevitably lead to cases in which
individual rights claims are deprived of any day in federal court to vindicate a constitutional right
either before or after the fact—all because of policy judgments taken by the federal courts. In
this fashion, judicial independence in its institutional form can be at war with the vindication of
individual rights.
The result here is consonant with a rich vein of scholarship expressing skeptical of the
Separation of Powers. For example, Elizabeth Magill has powerfully argued that the ideas of
balance and separation between branches cannot be cashed out meaningfully because “in the
contested cases, there is no principled way to distinguish between the relevant power” and “no
way to measure the distribution of power among the branches at any point in time and no method
to predict the effect of an institutional arrangement.”360 Magill’s work trains on the conceptual
integrity of the Separation of Powers and its consequences for the overall political system, rather
than the specific effects of judicial independence. Complementing Magill’s account, Daryl
Levinson and Richard Pildes have argued that “the degree and kind of competition between the
legislative and executive branches vary significantly, and may all but disappear, depending on
whether the House, Senate, and presidency are divided or unified by political party.”361 Their
argument, however, is tightly linked to the effects of party politics on legislative-executive
relations.
Supplementing that literature, this Article suggests that the policy effects of judicial
independence—which is another mode of institutional separation of authorities—are far less
constant or salutary than many have believed. Complementing work that excavates the limited
ability of federal courts to vindicate constitutional rights in the face of political resistance,362 my
excavation of the causal connection between judicial independence and constitutional
remediation therefore suggests that those who hope to realize the Bill of Rights’ aspirations
would do well not to follow its drafters advice: Independent courts, rather than the “peculiar …
guardians” of constitutional rights may often act as their most implacable foes precisely because
of their institutional interests qua courts.
Conclusion
The central goal of this Article has been to describe the rise of a fault-based system for
rationing both process and remedies for constitutional violations, and to hypothesize one cause of
that ascendancy that the literature has ignored. Since the early 1980s, a moment at which courts
360
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felt increasing pressure from the rise of mass incarceration, that regime has diffused from
constitutional tort jurisprudence to both the evidentiary suppression and the postconviction
habeas contexts. Scholars have failed to observe or study this doctrinal diffusion, or the
concomitant unification of remedies doctrine across the three most frequently invoked mechanics
for ex post redress for constitutional rights.
The rise of fault-based rationing, I have hypothesized, is not just a function of changing
judicial ideology. It is also a consequence of an independent federal judiciary pursuing its
interests and preferences by shaping doctrine. It thus flows, in some nontrivial measure, from our
commitment to judicial independence at the institutional level. The resulting legal landscape
raises many hard questions of how constitutional rights can, or should, be vindicated. At the very
least, the analysis presented here should call into question any easy or quick reliance on the
courts as the first and last best protectors of constitutional rights, at least so long as they are free
to pursue their own institutional interests.
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